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466
How bad is selfish routing?
 JOURNAL OF THE ACM
, 2002
"... We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route t ..."
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Cited by 678 (27 self)
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We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route traffic such that the sum of all travel times—the total latency—is minimized. In many settings, it may be expensive or impossible to regulate network traffic so as to implement an optimal assignment of routes. In the absence of regulation by some central authority, we assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimumlatency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a “selfishly motivated ” assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance. In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed). We also consider the more general setting in which edge latency functions are assumed only to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion. Here, the total
Selfish Unsplittable Flows
 Theoretical Computer Science
, 2004
"... What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routed selfishly in general networks with loaddependent edge delays? Motivated by this question we generalize the model of [14] to the case of weighted congestion games. We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the nature o ..."
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Cited by 86 (10 self)
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What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routed selfishly in general networks with loaddependent edge delays? Motivated by this question we generalize the model of [14] to the case of weighted congestion games. We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the nature
Improved Bounds for the Unsplittable Flow Problem
 In Proceedings of the 13th ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
, 2002
"... In this paper we consider the unsplittable ow problem (UFP): given a directed or undirected network G = (V, E) with edge capacities and a set of terminal pairs (or requests) with associated demands, find a subset of the pairs of maximum total demand for which a single flow path can be chosen for eac ..."
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Cited by 56 (6 self)
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In this paper we consider the unsplittable ow problem (UFP): given a directed or undirected network G = (V, E) with edge capacities and a set of terminal pairs (or requests) with associated demands, find a subset of the pairs of maximum total demand for which a single flow path can be chosen
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
, 2005
"... The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination. The splittable version of this problem is when demand can be satisfied by many paths, namely a flow from source to d ..."
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to destination. The unsplittable, or discrete version of the problem is more realistic yet is more complex from the algorithmic point of view; in some settings optimizing such unsplittable traffic flow is computationally intractable. In this paper, we assume this more realistic unsplittable model
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
, 2006
"... We consider general resource assignment games involving selfish users/agents in which users compete for resources and try to be assigned to resources which maximize their own benefits (e.g., try to route their traffic through links which minimize the latency of their own traffic). We propose and stu ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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We consider general resource assignment games involving selfish users/agents in which users compete for resources and try to be assigned to resources which maximize their own benefits (e.g., try to route their traffic through links which minimize the latency of their own traffic). We propose and study a mechanism design approach in which an allocation mechanism assigns users to resources and charges the users for using the resources so to induce each user to truthfully report a private piece of information he/she holds (e.g., how much traffic he/she needs to transmit). This information is crucial for computing optimal (or close to the optimal) allocations and an agent could misreport his/her information so to induce the underlying allocation algorithm to output a solution which he/she likes more (e.g., which assigns better resources to him/her). For our resource allocation problems, we give an algorithmic characterization of the solutions for which truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium. A natural application of these results is to a scheduling/routing problem which is the mechanism design “counterpart” of the selfish routing game of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999]: Each selfish user wants to route a piece of
On the SingleSource Unsplittable Flow Problem
, 1998
"... Let G = (V; E) be a capacitated directed graph with a source s and k terminals t i with demands d i , 1 i k. We would like to concurrently route every demand on a single path from s to the corresponding terminal without violating the capacities. There are several interesting and important varia ..."
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Cited by 48 (2 self)
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variations of this unsplittable flow problem. If the
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
, 2006
"... We consider general resource assignment games involving selfish users/agents in which users compete for resources and try to be assigned to resources which maximize their own benefits (e.g., try to route their traffic through links which minimize the latency of their own traffic). We propose and stu ..."
Abstract
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We consider general resource assignment games involving selfish users/agents in which users compete for resources and try to be assigned to resources which maximize their own benefits (e.g., try to route their traffic through links which minimize the latency of their own traffic). We propose and study a mechanism design approach in which an allocation mechanism assigns users to resources and charges the users for using the resources so to induce each user to truthfully report a private piece of information he/she holds (e.g., how much traffic he/she needs to transmit). This information is crucial for computing optimal (or close to the optimal) allocations and an agent could misreport his/her information so to induce the underlying allocation algorithm to output a solution which he/she likes more (e.g., which assigns better resources to him/her). For our resource allocation problems, we give an algorithmic characterization of the solutions for which truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium. A natural application of these results is to a scheduling/routing problem which is the mechanism design “counterpart” of the selfish routing game of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999]: Each selfish user wants to route a piece of
Combinatorial algorithms for the unsplittable flow problem
 Algorithmica
"... We provide combinatorial algorithms for the unsplittable flow problem (UFP) that either match or improve the previously best results. In the UFP we are given a (possibly directed) capacitated graph with n vertices and m edges, and a set of terminal pairs each with its own demand and profit. The obje ..."
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Cited by 10 (3 self)
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We provide combinatorial algorithms for the unsplittable flow problem (UFP) that either match or improve the previously best results. In the UFP we are given a (possibly directed) capacitated graph with n vertices and m edges, and a set of terminal pairs each with its own demand and profit
Strongly Polynomial Algorithms for the Unsplittable Flow Problem
 In Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization (IPCO
, 2001
"... We provide the first strongly polynomial algorithms with the best approximation ratio for all three variants of the unsplittable ow problem (UFP). In this problem we are given a (possibly directed) capacitated graph with n vertices and m edges, and a set of terminal pairs each with its own demand an ..."
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Cited by 48 (1 self)
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We provide the first strongly polynomial algorithms with the best approximation ratio for all three variants of the unsplittable ow problem (UFP). In this problem we are given a (possibly directed) capacitated graph with n vertices and m edges, and a set of terminal pairs each with its own demand
Approximation Algorithms for the Unsplittable Flow Problem ∗
, 2005
"... We present approximation algorithms for the unsplittable flow problem (UFP) in undirected graphs. As is standard in this line of research, we assume that the maximum demand is at most the minimum capacity. We focus on the nonuniform capacity case in which the edge capacities can vary arbitrarily ov ..."
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We present approximation algorithms for the unsplittable flow problem (UFP) in undirected graphs. As is standard in this line of research, we assume that the maximum demand is at most the minimum capacity. We focus on the nonuniform capacity case in which the edge capacities can vary arbitrarily
Results 1  10
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