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4,121
Is having a unique equilibrium robust?
 JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
, 2009
"... We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of nplayer finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true of N ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of nplayer finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true
Unique equilibrium in a dynamic model of crises with frictions
, 2005
"... This paper studies a dynamic model of crises with timing frictions that combines the main aspects of Morris and Shin (1998) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000). The usual arguments for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium cannot be applied. It is shown that the model has a unique equilibrium within th ..."
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This paper studies a dynamic model of crises with timing frictions that combines the main aspects of Morris and Shin (1998) and Frankel and Pauzner (2000). The usual arguments for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium cannot be applied. It is shown that the model has a unique equilibrium within
Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Rule of Law ∗
, 2006
"... This paper presents a model of Rule of Law in which a continuum of agents plays against the State for the appropriation of the economic assets of a stylised economy. The model shows how each agent can either challenge the State or acquiesce, with the latter having the choice of either protecting pro ..."
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equilibria. Introducing idiosyncratic information and sequential play generates a unique equilibrium, according to the global game approach. On the one hand, this model predicts that high uncertainty and sunk costs in law enforcement have a negative effect, pushing the economy towards a Pareto
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
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Cited by 555 (18 self)
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an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truthtelling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players
Auditor Independence as a Unique Equilibrium Response
 Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
, 1995
"... This paper demonstrates how strong auditor independence, as dejined by Antle (1984), can be achieved through an indirect reporting mechanism. A stylized principalagent model based on Antle (1982) is analyzed. In the model, an owner hires a manager and an auditor. In the optimal contracts for the ma ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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for the manager and the auditor, an equilibrium is desired where both the manager and the auditor provide high levels of effort and report their findings truthfully. However, two alternative equilibria exist where the auditor and the manager coordinate their strategies and pevorm tasks undesirable from the owner
A Condition for a Unique Equilibrium Point in a Recurrent Neural Network
"... This paper gives a sufficient condition on the weight matrix W of a recurrent neural network of the form x = \Gammax + oe(Wx) + I to have a unique equilibrium point for all values of I. It uses the following argument: if the net has multiple equilibria for some value of I then F : x 7! \Gammax ..."
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This paper gives a sufficient condition on the weight matrix W of a recurrent neural network of the form x = \Gammax + oe(Wx) + I to have a unique equilibrium point for all values of I. It uses the following argument: if the net has multiple equilibria for some value of I then F : x 7! \Gammax
On the Private Provision of Public Goods
 Journal of Public Economics
, 1986
"... We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. Howe ..."
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Cited by 564 (9 self)
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We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 647 (28 self)
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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish
Results 1  10
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4,121