-scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a large fraction of the network before it can achieve any significant gain

.i.d.) Gaussian random vector that is imperceptibly inserted in a spread-spectrum-like fashion into the perceptually most significant spectral components of the data. We argue that insertion of a watermark under this regime makes the watermark robust to signal processing operations (such as lossy compression

PDP (parallel distributed processing, or artificial neural network) models were too biologically unrealistic to provide viable interpretations of the single-cell data. Churchland and Sejnowski show how distributed models can now attack this problem, providing significant insights into brain function

failure which may not require any special equipment at all. We describe and give examples of each of these. Some of our attacks are significant improvements on the state of the art; others are useful cautionary tales. Together, they show that building tamper resistant devices, and using them effectively

work, our techniques have significantly higher precision (lower false positive rate) and lower computation overhead for the victim to reconstruct the attack paths under large scale distributed denial-of-service attacks. Furthermore the Authenticaed Marking Scheme provides efficient authentication

that there is an intimate relationship between the effectiveness of DPF at mitigating DDoS attack and powerlaw network topology. The salient features of this work are two-fold. First, we show that DPF is able to proactively filter out a significant fraction of spoofed packet flows and prevent attack packets from reaching

, and the bochs-x86 emulator. Although the performance penalty is significant, our prototype demonstrates the feasibility of the approach, and should be directly usable on a suitable-modified processor (e.g., the Transmeta Crusoe). Our approach is equally applicable against code-injecting attacks in scripting

The low-cost, off-the-shelf hardware components in unshielded sensor-network nodes leave them vulnerable to compromise. With little effort, an adversary may capture nodes, analyze and replicate them, and surreptitiously insert these replicas at strategic locations within the network. Such attacks

shown to often have lower overhead and faster reaction time than other types of routing based on periodic (proactive) mechanisms. Significant attention recently has been devoted to developing secure routing protocols for ad hoc networks, including a number of secure ondemand routing protocols

The exploitation of buffer overflow vulnerabilities in process stacks constitutes a significant portion of security attacks. We present two new methods to detect and handle such attacks. In contrast to previous work, the new methods work with any existing pre-compiled executable and can be used