The need for security has gained more importance in this information intense society. Cryptography is the design and analysis of mathematical structures that enable secure communications in the presence of malicious adversaries. Side channel attacks are a recent class of attacks that is very

of information, called side-channel information, can be exploited in side-channel attacks to retrieve secret keys. Side channel attacks have successfully broken many algorithms.

these attacks can be successfully applied in general and to a large class of ciphers. In this paper, we show that algebraic techniques can be combined with side-channel attacks in a very effective and natural fashion. As an illustration, we apply them to the block cipher PRESENT that is a stimulating first

Abstract. Side-channel attacks are a powerful tool to discover the cryptographic secrets of a chip or other device but only too often do they require too many traces or leave too many possible keys to explore. In this paper we show that for side channel attacks on discrete-logarithm-based systems

When it comes to cryptographic software, side channels are an often-overlooked threat. A side channel is any observable side effect of computation that an attacker could measure and possibly influence. Crypto is especially vulnerable to side channel attacks because of its strict requirements

In this paper, we report preliminary results obtained as a result of a systematic

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Encryption Standard (NIST FIPS-197) has been the subject of extensive cryptanalysis research. The importance of this research has intensified since AES was named, in 2003, by NSA as a Type-1 Suite B Encryption Algorithm (CNSSP-15). As such, AES is now authorized to protect classified and unclassified national security systems and information. This paper provides an overview of current cryptanalysis research on the AES cryptographic algorithm. Discussion is provided on the impact by each technique to the strength of the algorithm in national security applications. The paper is concluded with an attempt at a forecast of the usable life of AES in these applications.

Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to side-channel key recovery, that combines the low time/memory complexity and noise tolerance of standard (divide and conquer) differential power analysis with the optimal data complexity of algebraic side-channel attacks. Our fundamental