This paper describes a new operating system kernel, called the x-kernel, that provides an explicit architecture for constructing and composing network protocols. Our experience implementing and evaluating several protocols in the x-kernel shows that this architecture is both general enough

, that an improperly designed protocol could be vulnerable to an active saboteur, one who may impersonate another user or alter the message being transmitted. Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely. Algorithms and characteri-zations that can be used to determine

broad-cast authentication, which is an important mechanism for sensor networks. TESLA is a new protocol which provides authenticated broadcast for severely resource-constrained environments. We implemented the above protocols, and show that they are practical even on minimalistic hardware

This memo describes the Network Time Protocol (NTP) designed to distribute time information in a large, diverse internet system operating at speeds from mundane to lightwave. It uses a returnabletime architecture in which a distributed subnet of time servers operating in a self

that could support both unicast and many-to-many multicast applications. That effort led to the birth of RSVP. As a signaling protocol designed specifically to run over IP, RSVP distinguishes itself from previous signaling protocols in several fundamental ways. The most profound ones include a soft

We develop and analyze low-complexity cooperative diversity protocols that combat fading induced by multipath propagation in wireless networks. The underlying techniques exploit space diversity available through cooperating terminals’ relaying signals for one another. We outline several strategies

We describe a family of caching protocols for distrib-uted networks that can be used to decrease or eliminate the occurrence of hot spots in the network. Our protocols are particularly designed for use with very large networks such as the Internet, where delays caused by hot spots can be severe

We present general definitions of security for multi-party cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation

This RFC describes the details of the domain system and protocol, and assumes that the reader is familiar with the concepts discussed in a companion RFC, "Domain Names- Concepts and Facilities " [RFC-1034]. The domain system is a mixture of functions and data types which are an official

-to-end protocols, where loss recovery is performed by the sender; link-layer protocols, that provide local reliability; and split-connection protocols, that break the end-to-end connection into two parts at the base station. We present the results of several experiments performed in both LAN and WAN environments