There is a recent trend toward rule-based authorization systems to achieve flexible security policies. Also, new sensing technologies in pervasive computing make it possible to define context-sensitive rules, such as “allow database access only to staff who are currently located in the main office

Information flow security in a multilevel system aims at guaranteeing that no high level information is revealed to low level users, even in the presence of any possible malicious process. This requirement could be stronger than necessary when some knowledge about the environment (context) in which

Information flow security in a multilevel system aims at guaranteeing that no high level information is revealed to low level users, even in the presence of any possible malicious process. This requirement could be too demanding when some knowledge about the environment (context) in which

demanding when we have some knowledge about the contexts where the process is going to run. To deal with these situations we introduce the notion of secure contexts for a process. The notion is parametric with respect to both the observational equivalence and the operation used to characterize the low level

Ensuring secure information ow within programs in the context of multiple sensitivity levels has been widely studied. Especially noteworthy is Denning's work in secure ow analysis and the lattice model [6][7]. Until now, however, the soundness of Denning's analysis has not been

Abstract – This paper presents solutions for security context transfer for vertical handover between heterogeneous networks. Seamless vertical handover is an important function of Beyond 3G systems. Context transfer can help support seamless vertical handover while maintaining required security

current trend in security-related monitoring systems: not the exploit of vulnerable systems is being detected but aftereffects of a successful exploit are detected, e.g. installed and active versions of

, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, that allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols

Abstract Information flow security in a multilevel system aims at guaranteeing that no highlevel information is revealed to low level users, even in the presence of any possible malicious process. This requirement could be stronger than necessary when someknowledge about the environment (context

The notion of non-malleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related