• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart
  • DMCA
  • Donate

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations

Tools

Sorted by:
Try your query at:
Semantic Scholar Scholar Academic
Google Bing DBLP
Results 1 - 10 of 1,389
Next 10 →

Proof-Carrying Code

by George C. Necula , 1997
"... This paper describes proof-carrying code (PCC), a mechanism by which a host system can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a program supplied (possibly in binary form) by an untrusted source. For this to be possible, the untrusted code producer must supply with the code a safety proo ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1240 (27 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper describes proof-carrying code (PCC), a mechanism by which a host system can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a program supplied (possibly in binary form) by an untrusted source. For this to be possible, the untrusted code producer must supply with the code a safety

Temporal-Safety Proofs for Systems Code

by Thomas A. Henzinger, Ranjit Jhala, Rupak Majumdar, George C. Necula, Grégoire Sutre, Westley Weimer , 2002
"... We present a methodology and tool for verifying and certifying systems code. The veri cation is based on the lazy-abstraction paradigm for intertwining the following three logical steps: construct a predicate abstraction from the code, model check the abstraction, and automatically re ne the a ..."
Abstract - Cited by 88 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
the abstraction based on counterexample analysis. The certi cation is based on the proof-carrying code paradigm. Lazy abstraction enables the automatic construction of small proof certi cates. The methodology is implemented in Blast, the Berkeley Lazy Abstraction Software veri cation Tool. We describe our

Modular Type-Safety Proofs in Agda

by Christopher Schwaab, Jeremy G. Siek
"... Methods for reusing code are widespread and well researched, but methods for reusing proofs are still emerging. We consider the use of dependent types for this purpose, introducing a modular approach for composing mechanized proofs. We show that common techniques for abstracting algorithms over data ..."
Abstract - Cited by 5 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Methods for reusing code are widespread and well researched, but methods for reusing proofs are still emerging. We consider the use of dependent types for this purpose, introducing a modular approach for composing mechanized proofs. We show that common techniques for abstracting algorithms over

Featherweight Java: A Minimal Core Calculus for Java and GJ

by Atsushi Igarashi, Benjamin C. Pierce, Philip Wadler - ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems , 1999
"... Several recent studies have introduced lightweight versions of Java: reduced languages in which complex features like threads and reflection are dropped to enable rigorous arguments about key properties such as type safety. We carry this process a step further, omitting almost all features of the fu ..."
Abstract - Cited by 659 (23 self) - Add to MetaCart
computational “feel, ” providing classes, methods, fields, inheritance, and dynamic typecasts with a semantics closely following Java’s. A proof of type safety for Featherweight Java thus illustrates many of the interesting features of a safety proof for the full language, while remaining pleasingly compact

An operational semantics and type safety proof for multiple inheritance in C++

by Daniel Wasserrab, Tobias Nipkow, Gregor Snelting, Frank Tip - IN OOPSLA '06: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL ACM SIGPLAN CONFERENCE ON OBJECT-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING SYSTEMS, LANGUAGES, AND APPLICATIONS , 2006
"... We present an operational semantics and type safety proof for multiple inheritance in C++. The semantics models the behaviour of method calls, field accesses, and two forms of casts in C++ class hierarchies exactly, and the type safety proof was formalized and machine-checked in Isabelle/HOL. Our se ..."
Abstract - Cited by 16 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
We present an operational semantics and type safety proof for multiple inheritance in C++. The semantics models the behaviour of method calls, field accesses, and two forms of casts in C++ class hierarchies exactly, and the type safety proof was formalized and machine-checked in Isabelle/HOL. Our

Automatic safety proofs for asynchronous memory operations

by Matko Botinčan , Mike Dodds , Alastair F Donaldson , Matthew J Parkinson - In PPOPP , 2011
"... Abstract We present a work-in-progress proof system and tool, based on separation logic, for analysing memory safety of multicore programs that use asynchronous memory operations. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract We present a work-in-progress proof system and tool, based on separation logic, for analysing memory safety of multicore programs that use asynchronous memory operations.

Modular type-safety proofs using dependant types

by Christopher Schwaab, Jeremy G. Siek - CoRR
"... ar ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

Mechanized Safety Proofs for Disc-Constrained Aircraft

by David Renshaw, Sarah M. Loos, André Platzer , 2012
"... As airspace becomes ever more crowded, air traffic management must reduce both space and time between aircraft to increase throughput, and on-board collision avoidance systems become ever more important. These systems and the policies that they implement must be extremely reliable. In this paper we ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
As airspace becomes ever more crowded, air traffic management must reduce both space and time between aircraft to increase throughput, and on-board collision avoidance systems become ever more important. These systems and the policies that they implement must be extremely reliable. In this paper we consider implementations of distributed collision avoidance policies designed to work in environments with arbitrarily many aircraft. We formally verify that the policies are safe, even when new planes approach an in-progress avoidance maneuver. We show that the policies are flyable and that in every circumstance which may arise from a set of controllable initial conditions, the aircraft will never get too close to one another. Our approach relies on theorem proving in Quantified Differential Dynamic Logic (QdL) and the KeYmaeraD theorem prover for distributed hybrid systems. It represents an important step in formally verified, flyable, and distributed air traffic control.

Safe Kernel Extensions Without Run-Time Checking

by George C. Necula, Peter Lee - Proc. of OSDI'96
"... Abstract This paper describes a mechanism by which an operating system kernel can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a binary supplied by an untrusted source. The kernel first defines a safety policy and makes it public. Then, using this policy, an application can provide binaries i ..."
Abstract - Cited by 429 (20 self) - Add to MetaCart
in a special form called proof-carrying code, or simply PCC. Each PCC binary contains, in addition to the native code, a formal proof that the code obeys the safety policy. The kernel can easily validate the proof without using cryptography and without consulting any external trusted entities

A Machine-Checked Safety Proof for a CISC-Compatible SFI

by Stephen Mccamant, Stephen Mccamant - Technique,” MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Tech. Rep , 2006
"... Executing untrusted code while preserving security requires that the code be prevented from modify-ing memory or executing instructions except as explicitly allowed. Software-based fault isolation (SFI) or “sandboxing ” enforces such a policy by rewriting code at the instruction level. In previous w ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
in the safety provided by the technique. The proof, constructed for a simplified model of the technique using the ACL2 theo-rem proving environment, certifies that if the code rewriting has been checked to have been performed correctly, the resulting program cannot perform a dangerous operation when run. We
Next 10 →
Results 1 - 10 of 1,389
Powered by: Apache Solr
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit and Index Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2019 The Pennsylvania State University