Results 1 - 10 of 9,378

Sparse RSA Secret Keys and Their Generation

by Chae Hoon Lim, Pil Joong Lee - Queen's University , 1996
"... In this paper we consider the problem of reducing the computational load by use of restricted key parameters in the RSA system. We present various methods for generating RSA key parameters that can produce the secret key with much smaller binary weight than the ordinary case. This will greatly reduc ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
In this paper we consider the problem of reducing the computational load by use of restricted key parameters in the RSA system. We present various methods for generating RSA key parameters that can produce the secret key with much smaller binary weight than the ordinary case. This will greatly

Recovering RSA Secret Keys from Noisy Key Bits with Erasures and Errors

by Noboru Kunihiro, Naoyuki Shinohara, Tetsuya Izu , 2013
"... Abstract. We discuss how to recover RSA secret keys from noisy key bits with erasures and errors. There are two known algorithms recover-ing original secret keys from noisy keys. At Crypto 2009, Heninger and Shacham proposed a method for the case where an erroneous version of secret keys contains on ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We discuss how to recover RSA secret keys from noisy key bits with erasures and errors. There are two known algorithms recover-ing original secret keys from noisy keys. At Crypto 2009, Heninger and Shacham proposed a method for the case where an erroneous version of secret keys contains

Computing the RSA Secret Key is Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalent to Factoring

by Alexander May , 2004
"... We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge of the RSA public key/ secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N, e, d) ..."
Abstract - Cited by 19 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge of the RSA public key/ secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N, e, d

Deterministic Polynomial-Time Equivalence of Computing the RSA Secret Key and Factoring

by Jean-sébastien Coron , 2006
"... Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well known that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input (N, ..."
Abstract - Cited by 14 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well known that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input (N

Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalence of Computing the RSA Secret Key and Factoring

by Jean-Sebastien Coron, Alexander May - JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY , 2004
"... We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key-pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N, e, d) outp ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key-pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N, e, d

Deterministic Polynomial-Time Equivalence of Computing the RSA Secret Key and Factoring

by unknown authors , 2006
"... Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well known that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input (N, ..."
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Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptosystem: does the knowledge of the RSA public and secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well known that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on input (N

Computing the RSA Secret Key is Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalent to Factoring

by unknown authors
"... Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge of the RSA public key/ secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N, ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge of the RSA public key/ secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N

Computing the RSA Secret Key is Deterministic Polynomial Time Equivalent to Factoring

by unknown authors
"... Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge of the RSA public key/ secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N, ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We address one of the most fundamental problems concerning the RSA cryptoscheme: Does the knowledge of the RSA public key/ secret key pair (e, d) yield the factorization of N = pq in polynomial time? It is well-known that there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that on input (N

On Deterministic Polynomial-Time Equivalence of Computing the CRT-RSA Secret Keys and Factoring

by Subhamoy Maitra, Santanu Sarkar , 2009
"... Let N = pq be the product of two large primes. Consider CRT-RSA with the public encryption exponent e and private decryption exponents dp, dq. It is well known that given any one of dp or dq (or both) one can factorize N in probabilistic poly(log N) time with success probability almost equal to 1. ..."
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Let N = pq be the product of two large primes. Consider CRT-RSA with the public encryption exponent e and private decryption exponents dp, dq. It is well known that given any one of dp or dq (or both) one can factorize N in probabilistic poly(log N) time with success probability almost equal to 1

RSA meets DPA: Recovering RSA Secret Keys from Noisy Analog Data

by Noboru Kunihiro, Junya Honda
"... Abstract. We discuss how to recover RSA secret keys from noisy ana-log data obtained through physical attacks such as cold boot and side channel attacks. Many studies have focused on recovering correct secret keys from noisy binary data. Obtaining noisy binary keys typically in-volves rst observing ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We discuss how to recover RSA secret keys from noisy ana-log data obtained through physical attacks such as cold boot and side channel attacks. Many studies have focused on recovering correct secret keys from noisy binary data. Obtaining noisy binary keys typically in-volves rst observing
Results 1 - 10 of 9,378