"... In PAGE 16: ...Figure 7: Preliminary schedule for Project X Contractual payments and iterative milestones The Rational services group deals with many project teams who intend to follow an iterative software development approach but realize, too late, that they are bound to contracts fashioned according to traditional waterfall process milestones. When contract payments are tied to delivery of particular documents (see Table4 ), project teams tend to blindly use documentation as a misleading measure of project progress -- completed paperwork does not necessarily imply a completed executable. Contractors who are driven by the payment milestones stipulated in the contract will also push for document sign-off; they tend to spend disproportionate amounts of time getting each document deliverable 100 percent completed, signed off, and quot;frozen quot; before moving onto the next stage.... ..."

"... In PAGE 6: ... We briefly describe some of them below. Table2 shows the library operations for the sum, product, and Kleene closure of weighted transducers. Both destructive implementations, using the Thompson construction, and lazy implementations are provided.... ..."

"... In PAGE 6: ...optimization problem. We summarize the cost and trust properties over six di erent auction mech- anisms in Table1 and Table 2.3 We will introduce two new auction properties: bounded-rational compatible and untrusted-auctioneer compatible.... In PAGE 6: ... The premise of our work is that the cost of the rst cognitive process, that of determining a reservation price for a new, previously unvalued, good is nontrivial, and will often dominate any other costs to participation in an agent mediated on-line auction. In an auction that is buyer incentive compatible (IC B, Table1 ) the dominant strategy for a buyer is to bid her true value for a good [9]. It is not necessary for a buyer to incur the cognitive cost of strategic counterspeculation that can be useful in some auction mechanisms.... In PAGE 7: ... Di erent auction structures require vastly di erent expected e ort by buyers to determine a value for a good that is being auctioned. We introduce a new auc- tion property, bounded-rational compatible ( BRC, Table1 ). A bounded-rational compatible auction, such as the English auction, will often allow a bidding agent to follow an optimal bidding strategy with only approximate information on the value of a good.... In PAGE 8: ...price that is below the buyer apos;s true value. Finally, we also consider whether an auction mechanism has low communica- tion costs (COMM L, Table1 ). The communication cost of an auction mechanism depends on the size of a single bid, and the expected number of auction rounds.... In PAGE 10: ... This allows buyers to defray, and if possible avoid, the cogni- tive cost of placing an accurate valuation on a good. The auction mechanisms that we have considered that are both buyer incen- tive compatible and bounded-rational compatible are the rst price ascending auction and the second price descending auction (see Table1 ). We rule out the second price sealed bid (Vickrey) auction because it is not bounded-rational com- patible and we want to avoid the high cognitive cost of computing the reservation price for every auction.... In PAGE 11: ... Both progressive auctions are however susceptible to indirect price manipulation (ICS, Table 2). It is interesting to note that it is impossible for an auction mechanism to be both buyer and seller in- centive compatible (compare Table1 and Table 2) [22], and that we must accept indirect price manipulation in return for simple optimal bidding strategies. We conclude that the most suitable auction for agent mediated on-line auc- tions, when the space of possible goods is large and diverse, and users do not know their reservation prices for all goods, is the rst price ascending auction.... ..."

"... In PAGE 18: ...Table2 around here] The overall ranking of the rational agent for the same rates of experimentation, are presented in table 3. For the given rate of experimentation, the frequencies are computed by ranking utilities of the rational and N boundedly rational agents from the lowest to the highest at the end of each t for T max periods in 5 simulations.... ..."

"... In PAGE 7: ... All things consid- ered, our surgery planning application was very well perceived and is now used almost daily in clinical practice. Additional User Effort: In the routine clinical setting, prepro- cessing has been shown to take an average of 10 minutes ( Table3 ), and initial case setup for visualization up to 3 minutes. After initial explo- ration, all parameters of a case can be saved in an archived case le.... ..."

"... In PAGE 45: ... As an example, consider the following AS requirements: 1,500 MW of regulation, and 1,000 MW each of spinning, non-spinning, and replacement reserves. Under the existing procedure, market-clearing prices (MCP) presented in Table4 are obtained. If the rational buyer procedure is applied, then the MW purchased and the resulting prices change according to the right side of Table 4.... In PAGE 45: ... That is, 2,500 MW of regulation would be paid at $20/MW, and so on. The total payments to AS providers would be $95,000 (see Table4 ). AS buyers settlement would be based on the preliminary AS requirements (before the Rational Buyer procedure) and the final MCPs.... ..."

"... In PAGE 18: ... Clearly, the ranking of the rational agent worsens with the increases in the rate of experimentation. [ Table3 around here] 6. Concluding Remarks This paper examined the behavior of the exchange rate in the model with bound- edly rational agents who update their savings and portfolio decisions using a simple evolutionary algorithm based on imitation and experimentation.... ..."