, instead of connecting to the LBS. However, such a solution will only function if users are willing to share regional data obtained from the LBS provider. We model this collaborative location-data sharing problem with rational agents following threshold strategies. Initially, we study agent cooperation

Abstract. In WCDMA networks, most economic-based resource management algorithms only assumed that network users were obedient, that is, users only accepted the price declared by network, which is called as price acceptation mechanism. Many research issues argued that it is necessary to accommodate

against attacks from rational users, i.e., users that misuse the protocol if doing so increases their benefits (e.g., reduces download time or amount of upload capacity). We propose a rigorous model of rational file sharing for both seeders and leechers, building upon the concept of rational cryptography

I I It is no longer acceptable, in most circles, to present experimental results without describing the uncertainties involved. Besides its obvious role in pub-lishing, uncertainty analysis provides the experimenter a rational way of eval-uating the significance of the scatter on repeated trials

and reliability, rational users can have a greater impact. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of rationality in a federated cloud, by comparing the consumer welfare achieved by spot pricing, currently used in Amazon EC2, and a strategy-proof pricing scheme. We consider different EC2 regions as providers in a

alternative approximation procedures and heuristics for computation and knowledge acquisition. We discuss how knowledge about the structure of user utility can be used to control value tradeos for tailoring inference to alternative contexts. We address the notion of real-time rationality, focusing

Much of the existing work in peer to peer networking assumes that users will follow prescribed protocols without deviation. This assumption ignores the user's ability to modify the behavior of an algorithm for self-interested reasons.

energy in relaying, then network throughput will drop dramatically. Both these extreme scenarios (complete cooperation and complete noncooperation) are inimical to the interests of a user. In this paper we address the issue of user cooperation in ad hoc networks. We assume that nodes are rational, i

It is often suggested that users are hopelessly lazy and unmotivated on security questions. They chose weak passwords, ignore security warnings, and are oblivious to certificates errors. We argue that users ’ rejection of the security advice they receive is entirely rational from an economic

This paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. Existing proposals on the problem are no longer able to provide proper incentives when rational users collude or launch sybil attacks. To overcome this key limitation, we propose a novel decentralized DCast