. In this paper, we propose a logic that extends csl with a notion of plausibility that can be used for reasoning about the outcome of rational behavior (in the game-theoretical sense). Moreover, we show how a particular notion of beliefs can be defined on top of plausibility. The resulting logic, cslp, turns out

We show that the problem of model checking “ATLwith Plausibility ” is terms describing plausibility sets, and another one where plausibility as-sumptions are imposed through formulae of ATLI [19]. In both cases, the complexity results are the same. 1

A constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite Shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems. The resulting theory looks enough like

Intentions, an integral part of the mental state of an agent, play an important role in

-ity) allows us to specify sets of rational strategy profiles in the object lan-guage, and reason about agents ’ play if only these strategy profiles were allowed. For example, wemay assume the agents to play only Nash equi-libria, Pareto-optimal profiles or undominated strategies, and ask about the resulting

rationalized through the technological mediation and widespread standardization that occurs as games become large-scale social practices. We propose a theory of the rationalization of play (ludification), which outlines the key components of socially rationalized games, which we then apply to the specific

Recent neurological studies indicate that the role of emotion in human cognition is essential; emotions are not a luxury. Instead, emotions play a critical role in rational decision-making, in perception, in human interaction, and in human intelligence. These facts, combined with abilities

. Ross This paper uses an intertemporal general equilibrium asset pricing model to study the term structure of interest rates. In this model, anticipations, risk aversion, investment alternatives, and preferences about the timing of consumption all play a role in determining bond prices. Many

that it is sustained by player II's threat to play Y, which is not a credible threat, since a rational player II would not choose Y if her decision node were actually reached. It is examples like this one that have stimulated the search for a This is a substantial revision of a Working Paper with the same title

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