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Table 1 attempts to compare the main features of interest in the di erent pro- tocols we have examined in the paper. Those protocols that use public key cryptography are classi ed as using either light or heavy algorithms to indicate the computational complexity required by the mobile agents. It should be em- phasised that this gives only a rough indication since speci c algorithms can di er markedly in their required computation. However, in most cases we can di erentiate between those protocols which have been designed with the lim- ited computational ability of a mobile in mind, and which use light public key cryptography, and those which have not, and use heavy public key cryptography.
1998
"... In PAGE 11: ... Table1 . Comparison of Major Features of Di erent Protocols References 1.... ..."
Cited by 26
Table 2 shows the result of performing snmpget requests on the scalar sysDescr using different transports. There is a significant cost associated with the estab- lishment of SSH sessions. This is, however, not surprising since the SSH protocol establishes a session key using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange (using public-key cryptography) before the user authentication protocol is executed and the SSH channel is established. Since the cryptographic operations are CPU bound, the session establishment times increases significantly on our slow test machine.
2001
"... In PAGE 7: ... Table2 . Performance of snmpget requests (sysDescr.... In PAGE 7: ... Performance of snmpget requests (sysDescr.0) Table2 also shows that there is an clear difference in the amount of data (total size of the Ethernet frames) and the number of IP packets exchanged between UDP and TCP transports. While this overhead is usually not a big issue on a well functioning local area network, it might be an issue in networks... ..."
Cited by 1
Table I. A local challenge (LC) is a random number for authentication procedures. An MR or VMN encrypts the LC using a pre-defined SA with its AAAH server. The encrypted value is called a credential (CR), which is used to authenticate an MR which creates it. MRs and VMNs are identified by their NAIs and a replay protection indicator (RPI) is used to protect from a replay attack. Either a time stamp or a random number can be used as an RPI. The size of the KAAA field is 128 bytes by assuming a public key cryptography algorithm. As we adopt a symmetric key cryptography for dynamic keys (KLOCAL and KHOME, the size of each key is 32 bytes. Note that a dynamic key is used to establish a dynamic SA while a long-term key is to establish a long-term SA. Other notations will be elaborated later.
Table 3: Cryptographic operations in an SSL Handshake.
2004
"... In PAGE 7: ... 3.4 Public-Key Cryptography in SSL Table3 summarizes the various public-key cryptographic operations performed by a client and server in different modes of the SSL handshake. 1.... ..."
Cited by 11
Table 1: Our mechanisms compared with public key equivalents
2003
"... In PAGE 12: ... To compare these results to the efficiency of public-key cryptography, we analyzed the functionality provided by each mechanism. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table1 . The tree-authenticated one-way chain essentially provides a signature: given a public key (the root value), private values can be authenticated.... ..."
Cited by 44
Table 1: Our mechanisms compared with public key equivalents
2003
"... In PAGE 12: ... To compare these results to the ef ciency of public-key cryptography, we analyzed the functionality provided by each mechanism. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table1 . The tree-authenticated one-way chain essentially provides a signature: given a public key (the root value), private values can be authenticated.... ..."
Cited by 44
Table 1: Our mechanisms compared with public key equivalents
2003
"... In PAGE 12: ... To compare these results to the ef ciency of public-key cryptography, we analyzed the functionality provided by each mechanism. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table1 . The tree-authenticated one-way chain essentially provides a signature: given a public key (the root value), private values can be authenticated.... ..."
Cited by 44
Table 1: Our mechanisms compared with public key equivalents
2003
"... In PAGE 12: ... To compare these results to the efficiency of public-key cryptography, we analyzed the functionality provided by each mechanism. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table1 . The tree-authenticated one-way chain essentially provides a signature: given a public key (the root value), private values can be authenticated.... ..."
Cited by 44
Table 9: Key Material Exchange Protocols Proposed by ATM Forum
1998
"... In PAGE 35: ... {X} indicates that X is optional. With the aid of the above symbols, we summarize in Table9 the two protocols proposed in Phase I ATM Security Specification. It is stated in Phase I ATM Security Specification that the two key material exchange protocols can be implemented either in secret key (symmetric) cryptography or public key (asymmetric) cryptography.... ..."
Table 9: Key Material Exchange Protocols Proposed by ATM Forum
"... In PAGE 35: ... fXg indicates that X is optional. With the aid of the above symbols, we summarize in Table9 the two protocols proposed in Phase I ATM Security Speci cation. It is stated in Phase I ATM Security Speci cation that the two key material exchange protocols can be implemented either in secret key (symmetric) cryptography or public key (asymmetric) cryptography.... ..."
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