•  Further developed by mathematician Albert W.

Abstract not found

Abstract not found

Abstract not found

We compute the fraction of all the possible 2x2 symmetric nonzerosum games in strategic form with random payoff matrix falls into a certain class defined by Nash equilibrium conditions and Pareto optimality conditions 1

-round payoff of the strategy at the rate O((logN)1/2T−1/2). Finally, we apply our results to the problem of playing an unknown repeated matrix game. We show that our algorithm approaches the minimax payoff of the unknown game at the rate O(T−1/2).

: card 1 represents cooperation and card 2 betrayal. The score each player obtains is decided according to a 2 x 2 payoff matrix and depends on the combination of their selections. The P-score (‘‘P’ ’ for punishment) is defined as the score that is given when they both select betrayal. Comparing the two

In this research paper, we have dealt with a model of multi-objective two person zero-sum matrix game whose payoff values are vague sets. We have applied our approach to the numerical example of [Zhou, X., Song, Y., Zhang, Q. and Gao, X., “Multiobjective matrix game with vague payoffs. ” ICFIE, ASC

Abstract-Traditional iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) as- in light of the opponent's, is fixed and symmetric. That is, sumed a fixed payoff matrix for all players, which may not be the utility expectation of a strategy on rewards for certain realistic because not all players are the same

The standard payoff matrix between cooperators, C, and defectors, D, is given by