"... In PAGE 29: ... As will be discussed below, the mixed-Nash equilibrium concept captures the behavioral di#0Berences among the major cocoa producers. a#29 Actual Equilibrium #281986#29: Table9 presents simulations for the equilibria under actual taxes in 1986 as well as the welfare-maximizing, revenue-maximizing and mixed-Nash taxes. The world price in 1986 was US$ 2066 per mt.... In PAGE 32: ... The mixed-Nash equilibrium provides a solid example of asymmetry between two groups of countries. #28See panel #28d#29 of Table9 #29 Tax rates range between 63 and 86 per- cent in Africa and between 4.... In PAGE 32: ... On the other hand, mixed-Nash taxes for Africa are lower than revenue-maximizing Nash taxes. #28Compare with panel #28c#29 of Table9 .#29 5.... ..."

"... In PAGE 16: ...Table19 ). There is a stronger positive deviation from the Nash expectation in markets of three than in markets of two.... ..."

"... In PAGE 14: ...re few, and four are many, experimentalists claim (Huck et al., 2004). It therefore makes sense to look at outcomes for individual market sizes too. If one looks at the gross data, and at the deviation from the Walrasian equili- brium, theory seems to get it right ( Table18 ). Although the degree of collusion in quadropoly is much smaller than in triopoly, it again goes up to almost the level of triopoly in a market of five.... ..."

"... In PAGE 14: ... The larger the market, the smaller the degree of collusion. With respect to deviations from the Nash equilibrium, only the NN index leads to a significant result, and only if one reduces the sample to experiments that explicitly tested for market size ( Table16 ). The effect is also negative, but much less so than with the Walrasian equilibrium.... ..."

"... In PAGE 14: ... One may wonder whether, in a strict sense, this is a cardinal variable, but it is at any rate ordinal, which makes a linear regression meaningful. With respect to deviations from the Walrasian equilibrium, it is highly significant, and it has the expected result ( Table15 ). The larger the market, the smaller the degree of collusion.... ..."

"... In PAGE 9: ... Since we assume that agent values are expressible in price units, Pareto optimality cor- responds to global optimality. Example 2 There are two agents as described in Table1 , and the reserve price of each good is zero. The optimal solution, fn281n29 = fn282n29 = 1, is not in equilibrium at any prices, and indeed no equilibrium exists in this case.... In PAGE 22: ... And when a market good could be satisfied by basic goods unallocated in this solution, the reserves of those goods define an upper bound on its price. Example 8 Reconsider Example 2, with parameters illustrated by Table1 , and zero reserve prices. Although no price equilibrium exists for the original formula- tion, we can support the optimal solution with a combinatorial price equilibrium.... ..."