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Tolerating malicious device drivers in linux

by Silas Boyd-wickizer, Nickolai Zeldovich - In USENIX ATC , 2010
"... This paper presents SUD, a system for running existing Linux device drivers as untrusted user-space processes. Even if the device driver is controlled by a malicious adversary, it cannot compromise the rest of the system. One significant challenge of fully isolating a driver is to confine the action ..."
Abstract - Cited by 27 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper presents SUD, a system for running existing Linux device drivers as untrusted user-space processes. Even if the device driver is controlled by a malicious adversary, it cannot compromise the rest of the system. One significant challenge of fully isolating a driver is to confine

Malicious Hardware

by Suraj Sawant, Yogesh Vadam, Avadhut Bambarkar, Harsha Redkar
"... viruses were operates as software. Some of them been caught by antivirus, here we are introducing virus through hardware, hence antivirus won't be able to detect virus in hardware. Advanced attacking system, finding ghost drivers in any operating system, crashing down the system will be new app ..."
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viruses were operates as software. Some of them been caught by antivirus, here we are introducing virus through hardware, hence antivirus won't be able to detect virus in hardware. Advanced attacking system, finding ghost drivers in any operating system, crashing down the system will be new

Unmodified device driver reuse and improved system dependability via virtual machines

by Joshua Levasseur, Volkmar Uhlig, Jan Stoess, Stefan Götz - In Proceedings of the 6th Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation , 2004
"... We propose a method to reuse unmodified device drivers and to improve system dependability using virtual machines. We run the unmodified device driver, with its original operating system, in a virtual machine. This approach enables extensive reuse of existing and unmodified drivers, independent of t ..."
Abstract - Cited by 134 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
of the OS or device vendor, significantly reducing the barrier to building new OS endeavors. By allowing distinct device drivers to reside in separate virtual machines, this technique isolates faults caused by defective or malicious drivers, thus improving a system’s dependability. We show that our

Malicious code detection for open firmware

by Frank Adelstein, Matt Stillerman - In Proc. 18th Computer Security Applications Conf. (ACSAC’02 , 2002
"... Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically w ..."
Abstract - Cited by 9 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Malicious boot firmware is a largely unrecognized but significant security risk to our global information infrastructure. Since boot firmware executes before the operating system is loaded, it can easily circumvent any operating system-based security mechanism. Boot firmware programs are typically

Assessing the Trustworthiness of Drivers

by Shengzhi Zhang, Peng Liu
"... Abstract. Drivers, especially third party drivers, could contain mali-cious code (e.g., logic bombs) or carefully designed-in vulnerabilities. Generally, it is extremely difficult for static analysis to identify these code and vulnerabilities. Without knowing the exact triggers that cause the execut ..."
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Abstract. Drivers, especially third party drivers, could contain mali-cious code (e.g., logic bombs) or carefully designed-in vulnerabilities. Generally, it is extremely difficult for static analysis to identify these code and vulnerabilities. Without knowing the exact triggers that cause

iKernel: Isolating Buggy and Malicious Device Drivers Using HardwareVirtualization Support

by Lin Tan, Ellick M. Chan, Reza Farivar, Nevedita Mallickjeffrey, C. Carlyle, Francis M. David, Roy H. Campbell
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 5 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

Counter Measures against Malicious Program in Universal Serial Bus

by unknown authors
"... Abstract — USB that are used to transfer the data through computers.It will available in a smaller size to do certain amount of data files. The USB are used as in many format like mass storage devices, etc. where the information security in the universal serial bus due to insecure design the USB can ..."
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can easily attack.The malicious code can exploit the USB drivers and autoplay features to launch various software attacks on host and USB devices.The worms or virus are malware that are replicating through the USB devices and they are attacking the normal function of the operating systems.The purpose

Nonverbal Indicators of Malicious Intent: Affective Components for Interrogative Virtual Reality Training

by Jean Catanzaro, Mark Phillips
"... Models of affective behavior are critical for the development of training systems that are designed to exercise social interactions. Potential applications include various security-oriented operations such as police interrogation, airport security, border crossings, and military peacekeeping. Aside ..."
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drivers of vehicles about their identity and reasons for entering a secured area. Most of the encounters are routine and innocuous, but occasionally a scenario unfolds that requires additional interrogation and rapid decision-making the part of the trainee. These special scenarios require the individual

DRIP: A Framework for Purifying Trojaned Kernel Drivers

by Zhongshu Gu, William N. Sumner, Zhui Deng, Xiangyu Zhang, Dongyan Xu
"... Abstract—Kernel drivers are usually provided in the form of loadable kernel extensions, which can be loaded/unloaded dynamically at runtime and execute with the same privilege as the core operating system kernel. The unrestricted security access from the drivers to the kernel is nevertheless a doubl ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
double-edged sword that makes them susceptible targets of trojan attacks. Given a benign driver, it is now easy to implant malicious logic with existing hacking tools. Once implanted, such malicious logic is difficult to detect. In this paper we propose DRIP, a framework for detecting and eliminating

Performance Optimizations for Isolated Driver Domains

by Sushrut Shirole, Godmar Back Chair, Keith Bisset, Kirk Cameron, Sushrut Shirole , 2014
"... In most of today’s operating system architectures, device drivers are tightly coupled with other kernel components. In such systems, a fault caused by a malicious or faulty device driver often leads to complete system failure, thereby reducing the overall reliability of the system. Even though a maj ..."
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In most of today’s operating system architectures, device drivers are tightly coupled with other kernel components. In such systems, a fault caused by a malicious or faulty device driver often leads to complete system failure, thereby reducing the overall reliability of the system. Even though a
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