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Iterated Strict Dominance in General Games
, 2005
"... We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS ∗ ) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS ∗ is always a welldefined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in do ..."
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Cited by 17 (1 self)
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We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS ∗ ) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS ∗ is always a welldefined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium
WHEN ORDER MATTERS FOR ITERATED STRICT DOMINANCE *
, 1999
"... Abstract: We demonstrate that iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. We also prove that order does not matter if strategy spaces are compact and payoff functions continuous. Examples show that this result is tight. ..."
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Abstract: We demonstrate that iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. We also prove that order does not matter if strategy spaces are compact and payoff functions continuous. Examples show that this result is tight.
Incomplete Preference, Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
, 2004
"... In his seminal paper, Epstein (1997) generalized to nonsubjective utility model that (correlated) rationalizability is a consequence of common knowledge of rationality in finite normal form games, and showed related results of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and a posteriori equl ..."
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In his seminal paper, Epstein (1997) generalized to nonsubjective utility model that (correlated) rationalizability is a consequence of common knowledge of rationality in finite normal form games, and showed related results of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and a posteriori
Existence And Uniqueness Of Maximal Reductions Under Iterated Strict Dominance
, 2002
"... Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to empty strategy sets. If best replies are welldefined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot appear; if strategy ..."
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Cited by 24 (0 self)
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Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to empty strategy sets. If best replies are welldefined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot appear; if strategy
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OFMAXIMAL REDUCTIONS UNDER ITERATED STRICT DOMINANCE
"... Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to empty strategy sets. If best replies are welldefined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot appear; if strategy sp ..."
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Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is an order dependent procedure. It can also generate spurious Nash equilibria, fail to converge in countable steps, or converge to empty strategy sets. If best replies are welldefined, then spurious Nash equilibria cannot appear; if strategy
Jim Ratliff virtualperfection.com/gametheory Nonequilibrium Solution Concepts: Iterated
"... Iterated strict dominance____________________________________________________________3 Common knowledge of rationality____________________________________________________4 Iterated strict dominance: formal definition ____________________________________________7 ..."
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Iterated strict dominance____________________________________________________________3 Common knowledge of rationality____________________________________________________4 Iterated strict dominance: formal definition ____________________________________________7
KSVD: An Algorithm for Designing Overcomplete Dictionaries for Sparse Representation
, 2006
"... In recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of sparse representation of signals. Using an overcomplete dictionary that contains prototype signalatoms, signals are described by sparse linear combinations of these atoms. Applications that use sparse representation are many and inc ..."
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Cited by 935 (41 self)
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signal representations. Given a set of training signals, we seek the dictionary that leads to the best representation for each member in this set, under strict sparsity constraints. We present a new method—the KSVD algorithm—generalizing the umeans clustering process. KSVD is an iterative method
The Capacity of LowDensity ParityCheck Codes Under MessagePassing Decoding
, 2001
"... In this paper, we present a general method for determining the capacity of lowdensity paritycheck (LDPC) codes under messagepassing decoding when used over any binaryinput memoryless channel with discrete or continuous output alphabets. Transmitting at rates below this capacity, a randomly chos ..."
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Cited by 574 (9 self)
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exponentially fast in the length of the code with arbitrarily small loss in rate.) Conversely, transmitting at rates above this capacity the probability of error is bounded away from zero by a strictly positive constant which is independent of the length of the code and of the number of iterations performed
Policy gradient methods for reinforcement learning with function approximation.
 In NIPS,
, 1999
"... Abstract Function approximation is essential to reinforcement learning, but the standard approach of approximating a value function and determining a policy from it has so far proven theoretically intractable. In this paper we explore an alternative approach in which the policy is explicitly repres ..."
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Cited by 439 (20 self)
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that the gradient can be written in a form suitable for estimation from experience aided by an approximate actionvalue or advantage function. Using this result, we prove for the first time that a version of policy iteration with arbitrary differentiable function approximation is convergent to a locally optimal
Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance
 EC'05
, 2005
"... We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We first study both strict and weak dominance (not iterated), and show that checking whether a given strategy is dominated by some mixed strategy can be done in polynomial time using a single linear progr ..."
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Cited by 27 (9 self)
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We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We first study both strict and weak dominance (not iterated), and show that checking whether a given strategy is dominated by some mixed strategy can be done in polynomial time using a single linear
Results 1  10
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3,174