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Results 1 - 10
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534
ERC -- A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition
- FORTHCOMING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 1999
"... We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two-perio ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 738 (21 self)
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-period alternating offer, and dictator games; games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the gift exchange game; and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand and Cournot markets, and the guessing game.
Fairness in an Intergenerational . . .
, 2008
"... Experimental evidence indicates that non-monetary considerations influence subjects’ allocation behavior. We investigate the impact of a multigeneration setup on allocation behavior. We modify the traditional dictator game by introducing 3 generations A, B and C. A takes an arbitrary share of a pie ..."
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and passes the rest to B. B divides the rest of the pie between her and C. We find that this intergenerational dictator game increases generosity with respect to comparable traditional dictator games. Introducing a social interaction between A and B on the one hand and B and C on the other hand leads to a
Intergenerational Fairness in a Sequential Dictator Game With Social Interaction
, 2007
"... We modify the traditional dictator game by introducing 3 generations A, B and C. A takes an arbitrary share of a pie and passes the rest to B. B divides the rest of the pie between her and C. We find that this sequential dictator game increases generosity with respect to comparable traditional dicta ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We modify the traditional dictator game by introducing 3 generations A, B and C. A takes an arbitrary share of a pie and passes the rest to B. B divides the rest of the pie between her and C. We find that this sequential dictator game increases generosity with respect to comparable traditional
Social Distance and Otherregarding Behavior in Dictator Games
- Comment” The American Economic Review
, 1999
"... A surprisingly large amount of otherregarding behavior is the common finding of experiments on bargaining, public goods, and trust. Elizabeth Hoffman et al. ( hereafter, HMS) ( 1996) have provided an insightful analysis of why experimental results deviate from game theoretic predictions in dictator ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 162 (11 self)
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in dictator games. 1 The authors conclude that individuals’ dispositional knowledge about social norms and reciprocity is activated by decreasing social distance even though the dictator game explicitly excludes reciprocal sanctioning possibilities by experimental design. We challenge this conclusion. While
in dictator games
, 2011
"... Abstract Many previous experiments document that behavior in multi-person settings responds to the name of the game and the labeling of strategies. With a few exceptions, these studies cannot tell whether frames affect preferences or beliefs. In three large experiments, we investigate whether social ..."
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social framing effects are also present in Dictator games. Since only one of the subjects makes a decision, the frame can affect behavior merely through preferences. In all the experiments, we find that behavior is insensitive to social framing. We discuss how to reconcile the absence of social framing
Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in altruism
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
, 2001
"... We study gender differences in altruism by examining a modi�ed dictator game with varying incomes and prices. Our results indicate that the question “which is the fair sex? ” has a complicated answer—when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is cheap, men are more altruistic. That is ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 258 (15 self)
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We study gender differences in altruism by examining a modi�ed dictator game with varying incomes and prices. Our results indicate that the question “which is the fair sex? ” has a complicated answer—when altruism is expensive, women are kinder, but when it is cheap, men are more altruistic
Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game
, 1998
"... This paper introduces the sequential dictator game to study how social influence may affect subjects ' choices when making dictator allocations. Subjects made dictator allocations of 840 before and after learning the allocation made by one other subject in the Relevant Information treatment, or ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 72 (3 self)
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This paper introduces the sequential dictator game to study how social influence may affect subjects ' choices when making dictator allocations. Subjects made dictator allocations of 840 before and after learning the allocation made by one other subject in the Relevant Information treatment
Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
- International Journal of Game Theory
, 1998
"... In both dictator and impunity games, one player, the dictator, divides a fixed amount of money between himself and one other, the recipient. Recent lab studies of these games have produced seemingly inconsistent results, reporting substantially divergent amounts of dictator giving. Also, one promine ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 116 (1 self)
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In both dictator and impunity games, one player, the dictator, divides a fixed amount of money between himself and one other, the recipient. Recent lab studies of these games have produced seemingly inconsistent results, reporting substantially divergent amounts of dictator giving. Also, one
Reciprocity in a twopart dictator game
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
, 2004
"... Abstract. Reciprocity is a widely observed phenomenon for which evolutionary foundations are posited. We conduct a dictator game in which recipients in an initial game become dictators in a second game. The amount sent by those sending back to the person from whom they received some or no dollars is ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 43 (2 self)
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Abstract. Reciprocity is a widely observed phenomenon for which evolutionary foundations are posited. We conduct a dictator game in which recipients in an initial game become dictators in a second game. The amount sent by those sending back to the person from whom they received some or no dollars
Results 1 - 10
of
534
