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Doubleoracle Algorithm for Computing an Exact Nash Equilibrium in Zerosum Extensiveform Games
"... We investigate an iterative algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium in twoplayer zerosum extensiveform games with imperfect information. The approach uses the sequenceform representation of extensiveform games and the doubleoracle algorithmic framework. The main idea is to restrict t ..."
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Cited by 7 (2 self)
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We investigate an iterative algorithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium in twoplayer zerosum extensiveform games with imperfect information. The approach uses the sequenceform representation of extensiveform games and the doubleoracle algorithmic framework. The main idea is to restrict
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 556 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
 American Economic Review
, 2005
"... This paper argues that a broad class of search models cannot generate the observed businesscyclefrequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude. In the U.S., the vacancyunemployment ratio is 20 times as volatile as average labor productivity ..."
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Cited by 839 (20 self)
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that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. ∗ This is a major revision of ‘Equilibrium Unemployment Fluctuations’. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Olivier
Automobile prices in market equilibrium
 Econometrica
, 1995
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
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Cited by 510 (18 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
Exact Sampling with Coupled Markov Chains and Applications to Statistical Mechanics
, 1996
"... For many applications it is useful to sample from a finite set of objects in accordance with some particular distribution. One approach is to run an ergodic (i.e., irreducible aperiodic) Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the desired distribution on this set; after the Markov chain has ..."
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Cited by 548 (13 self)
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, and that outputs samples in exact accordance with the desired distribution. The method uses couplings, which have also played a role in other sampling schemes; however, rather than running the coupled chains from the present into the future, one runs from a distant point in the past up until the present, where
On the Private Provision of Public Goods
 Journal of Public Economics
, 1986
"... We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. Howe ..."
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Cited by 546 (8 self)
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We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good
Worstcase equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 1999
"... In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a ver ..."
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Cited by 851 (17 self)
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In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 634 (27 self)
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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
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Cited by 324 (23 self)
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We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability
Expectations and the Neutrality of Money
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
, 1972
"... This paper provides a simple example of an economy in which equilibrium prices and quantities exhibit what may be the central feature of the modern business cycle: a systematic relation between the rate of change in nominal prices and the level of real output. The relationship, ..."
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Cited by 858 (5 self)
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This paper provides a simple example of an economy in which equilibrium prices and quantities exhibit what may be the central feature of the modern business cycle: a systematic relation between the rate of change in nominal prices and the level of real output. The relationship,
Results 1  10
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416,315