microsimulation of location choices with a

their own private utility. We present, under some basic assumptions, guarantees on the social performance of Nash equilibria. For submodular utility functions, any Nash equilibrium gives an expected social utility within a factor 2 of optimal, subject to a function-dependent additive term. For non

This paper examines a two stage model of product choice with elastic demand. The duopolists choose locations in the initial stage and compete in prices in the next stage. The consumers' demand varies inversely with price. The existence of Nash equilibrium prices in the second stage for each

Notes: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and critical comments.

by the Office of Econonuc Opportunity pursuant to the Economic

demand elasticities across quality segments

is negatively correlated with their productivity, only the core-periphery (par-tially stratified) equilibria are stable. When workers ’ marginal willingness to pay for housing and their productivity are positively correlated, there is no core-periphery equilibrium. Location can at best be an approximate rather

, the equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner-take-all competition, tradeoffs between profits

The purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the gen-eral equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality. We estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios

is closer to her ideal point by some #xed distance #. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails