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EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING STRATEGIES IN COMMONVALUE SEALEDBID AUCTIONS by
"... Abstract. We consider sealedbid auctions of an item with unknown, but common value to all bidders, and assume that each bidder has an estimate of the item’s value. Formulas are developed for the expected profit of bidders under various bidding strategies in both firstprice and secondprice auction ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract. We consider sealedbid auctions of an item with unknown, but common value to all bidders, and assume that each bidder has an estimate of the item’s value. Formulas are developed for the expected profit of bidders under various bidding strategies in both firstprice and second
Comparative Analysis for the Equilibrium Bidding Strategies of the Standard Auction Based on the Revenue Equivalence Principle
"... It has analyzed the transition processes for the content of the revenue equivalence principle. It used the revenue equivalence principle to derive the equilibrium bidding strategies in the first, second and third price auction and the allpay auction from the expected payment of the bidders. Based o ..."
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It has analyzed the transition processes for the content of the revenue equivalence principle. It used the revenue equivalence principle to derive the equilibrium bidding strategies in the first, second and third price auction and the allpay auction from the expected payment of the bidders. Based
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.
, 1988
"... Abstract This paper presents a Downsian model of political competition in which parties have incomplete but richer information than voters on policy effects. Each party can observe a private signal of the policy effects, while voters cannot. In this setting, voters infer the policy effects from the ..."
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Cited by 734 (4 self)
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the party platforms. In this political game with private information, we show that there exist weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBEs) at which the parties play different strategies, and thus, announce different platforms even when their signals coincide. This result is in contrast with the conclusion
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
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Cited by 555 (18 self)
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an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truthtelling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 647 (28 self)
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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
 Econometrica, September
"... We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ‘‘regretmatching.’’ In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive procedu ..."
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Cited by 336 (14 self)
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We propose a new and simple adaptive procedure for playing a game: ‘‘regretmatching.’’ In this procedure, players may depart from their current play with probabilities that are proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies in the past. It is shown that our adaptive
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1982
"... A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the singleperiod dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repe ..."
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Cited by 388 (1 self)
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A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the singleperiod dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely
The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative multiagent systems
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI98
, 1998
"... Reinforcement learning can provide a robust and natural means for agents to learn how to coordinate their action choices in multiagent systems. We examine some of the factors that can influence the dynamics of the learning process in such a setting. We first distinguish reinforcement learners that a ..."
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Cited by 377 (1 self)
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structure and exploration strategies on convergence to (optimal and suboptimal) Nash equilibria. We then propose alternative optimistic exploration strategies that increase the likelihood of convergence to an optimal equilibrium.
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
, 2001
"... A benchmark "package auction" is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. If all bidders bid straightforwardly, then the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy that minimizes the seller's revenue. When goods are substitutes, straigh ..."
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Cited by 150 (11 self)
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, straightforward bidding strategies comprise an ex post Nash equilibrium. Compared to the Vickrey auction, the benchmark ascending package auction has cheaper information processing, better handling of budget constraints, and less vulnerability to joint bidding strategies among bidders who would otherwise
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm
, 1998
"... In this paper, we adopt generalsum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zerosum stochastic games to a broader framework. We design a multiagent Qlearning method under this framework, and prove that it converges to a Na ..."
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Cited by 331 (4 self)
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Nash equilibrium under specified conditions. This algorithm is useful for finding the optimal strategy when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game. When there exist multiple Nash equilibria in the game, this algorithm should be combined with other learning techniques to find optimal
Results 1  10
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