We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as long as users do not anticipate the effect of their actions on prices, a simple proportional pricing mechanism can maximize the sum of users’ utilities minus the cost (called aggregate surplus). Continuing previous efforts to quantify the effects of selfish behavior in network pricing mechanisms, we consider the possibility that users anticipate the effect of their actions on link prices. Under the assumption that the links’ marginal cost functions are convex, we establish existence of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the aggregate surplus at a Nash equilibrium is no worse than a factor of 4 √ 2 − 5 times the optimal aggregate surplus; thus, the efficiency loss when users are selfish is no more than approximately 34%.

Frisch were interested in estimating the elasticities of demand and supply for products ranging from herring to butter, usually with time series data. If the demand and supply curves shift over time, the observed data on quantities and prices reflect a set of equilibrium points on both curves

the properties of an elastic-supply Progressive Second Price (es-PSP) auction mechanism, which requires each PEV agent to submit a desired energy quantity and a per-unit willingness-to-pay value. We establish that social efficiency is attained at Nash equilibria, and PEV agents acting in self-interest have

propositions about supply, demand, and the pattern of production; and before indicating the historical content of the categories I shall briefly state the underlying propositions. A Dynamic Theory of Production The classical theory of production is formulated under essentially static assumptions which freeze

The sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics, the analysis of social security and pensions, and the study of life cycle patterns of work. This paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substi

elastic housing supply have fewer and shorter bubbles, with smaller price increases. However, the welfare consequences of bubbles may actually be higher in more elastic places because those places will overbuild more in response to a bubble. The data show that the price run-ups of the 1980s were almost

The supply elasticity of housing determines how quickly house prices respond to economic shocks and this has many real economic consequences. Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) describes its importance in housing market analysis: „most housing

We build a life cycle model of labor supply that incorporates changes along both the intensive and extensive margin and use it to assess the consequences of changes in tax and transfer policies on equilibrium hours of work. We find that changes in taxes have large aggregate effects on hours of work

In a prior study, the author determined that cross elasticity of supply is rarely discussed in intermediate microeconomics, and industrial organization textbooks used in U. S. universities. He did, however, find that the American judicial system has increasingly relied upon the concept in defining

This paper introduces an elastic labor supply into a simple AK investment-based growth model, using this model to analyze fiscal policy in the form of distortionary taxes and government expenditure changes. Under plausible conditions, the economy will always lie on its balanced growth path, just