### Table 1 Properties of the cryptographic primitives

2001

"... In PAGE 3: ... Assumption (Black-box assumption). The axioms in Table1 are the only way in which a passive intruder can infer new knowledge from known data. Obviously, this is a rather strong assumption to make in practice, since in real-world cryptography, it is often possible to infer partial or statistical information about the content of a message, without necessarily understanding the entire message.... In PAGE 3: ... However, the black-box assumption is essential to our model, and in fact to most other logic-based models of cryptographic protocols. In addition to the general-purpose axioms shown in Table1 , there will also be protocol-speci c axioms. The intuition is that the general-purpose axioms capture all the ways in which a passive intruder can infer knowledge, namely by looking at data and analyzing it.... In PAGE 6: ... While this is a liveness property and not a security property, it is certainly important that a protocol should not be \over-speci ed quot; by relying on the principals to use information that they do not have access to. The reader may verify that in the presence of the axioms from Table1 , i(A; B) is logically derivable from K K A and K sA;B, while r(A; B) is logically derivable from K K B and K sA;B. Thus, any principal with knowledge of a private key can participate in this protocol.... In PAGE 6: ... Recall that the informal requirement was that the intruder should not be able to learn the secret sA;B for any honest principals A and B. Let be the set of axioms from Table1 . Let be the following... In PAGE 11: ...models, it follows that is intuitionistically provable. 2 Note that all axioms in Table1 are of Type 1, as are the protocol-speci c axioms. The formula is of Type 0.... ..."

Cited by 7

### Table 5.1: Comparison of RFID security protocols Proposal Cryptographic Authen- Privacy State update Backend primitive tication in tag efficient

2006

### TABLE 4. Symmetric key cryptographic algorithms security and performance comparison values

### TABLE 4. Symmetric key cryptographic algorithms security and performance comparison values

### Table 1. Timing measurements for cryptographic primitives on the PalmPilot

1999

"... In PAGE 8: ... Since this signature needs to take place on the PalmPilot, the withdrawal request is signed using an ECC-DSA signature (as opposed to an RSA signature) to minimize the signature generation time. (Recall that from Table1 , ECC-DSA signature generation takes 776ms on average, while RSA signature generation takes over 7000ms.) After the bank receives the withdrawal request and veri es the user apos;s signa- ture, the bank then generates a hash chain certi cate, signs it, and sends it to the user apos;s wallet.... ..."

Cited by 3

### Table 1. Cryptographic Algorithm Overhead

2003

"... In PAGE 11: ... For each algorithm, we tested it for 20 times. Table1 shows the calculated average time for computing 128 bits of data for each algorithm. From Table 1 we see that: 1) RC5 is a good candidate for motes.... In PAGE 11: ...ime. For each algorithm, we tested it for 20 times. Table 1 shows the calculated average time for computing 128 bits of data for each algorithm. From Table1 we see that: 1) RC5 is a good candidate for motes. It uses less memory (both in code size and data size), and it is very efficient.... ..."

Cited by 45

### Table 1. Cryptographic function notation Notation Description

"... In PAGE 3: ... There are two types of token: primitives such as participant identifiers, and functions over tokens. Table1 defines cryptographic functions used in Section 2.2.... ..."

### Table 2: Cryptographic algorithms and technology used

"... In PAGE 7: ... 3.3 Algorithms and technology Table2 gives an overview of all the cryptographic primitives and algorithms that are used in the di erent systems. In the SESAME column, the apos;x apos; denotes the fact that this algorithm is used in the public release.... ..."

### Table 1). Table 1. Timing measurements of low-level cryptographic primitives on an iPAQ H3630.

2004

Cited by 5

### Table 4: Cryptographic primitive cost. This table lists the cost of the basic cryptographic primitives, and the file systems operations where they are incurred. The root signature and verification is done only once per file read or write, irrespective of the size of the file. Wire integrity is needed only for messages, not for file contents.

2003

"... In PAGE 10: ... 7.2 Cryptographic cost Table4 presents the impact of encryption/decryption on read and write latency. These are measurements of the cryptographic cost that includes write verification, data encryption, and wire-transmission overheads.... ..."

Cited by 58