### Table 2: Communication complexities of cryptographic MPC protocols.

"... In PAGE 12: ... On the other hand, when using the broadcast protocol of [FM88], the round complexity is O(m), but the message complexity is increased to O(mn6). Table2 summarized these complexities.... ..."

### Table 1. Notation for specifying cryptographic protocols

"... In PAGE 2: ... Finally, we will give a brief conclusion. NOTATION FOR PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION The notation in Table1... ..."

### Table 2.1: Notation of Cryptographic Protocols

### Table 5 Memory requirements for the protocol of the dining cryptographers.

in Automatic verification of multi-agent systems by model checking via ordered binary decision diagrams

### Table 2.1: Notation of Cryptographic Protocols

### Table 1: Comparison of Efficient Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Atomic Broadcast Protocols

2005

"... In PAGE 17: ... 5.2 Comparison Table1 compares the synchrony assumptions, cryptographic requirements, and message complexity of Protocol PABC with the other recent Byzantine-fault-tolerant atomic broadcast protocols mentioned in the introduction. We devote the rest of this section to a more elaborate comparison with the two protocols closest to ours, namely the BFT protocol and the KS protocol.... ..."

### Table 1: Comparison of Efficient Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Atomic Broadcast Protocols

2005

"... In PAGE 17: ... 5.2 Comparison Table1 compares the synchrony assumptions, cryptographic requirements, and message complexity of Protocol PABC with the other recent Byzantine-fault-tolerant atomic broadcast protocols mentioned in the introduction. We devote the rest of this section to a more elaborate comparison with the two protocols closest to ours, namely the BFT protocol and the KS protocol.... ..."

### Table 1. Comparison of the hybrid key establishment protocol and its MSR-combined version with other public-key based key establishment protocols Computation complexity on sensor side

2003

"... In PAGE 11: ... We compare the sensor side computation complexity, processing time on M16C and the bandwidth requirements. We list the comparison results of our hybrid key establishment protocols with other public-key based key establishment protocols in Table1 , where computation complexity on sensor side is expressed in numbers of performing the cryptographic operations, including elliptic curve scalar multiplication of a random point (EC-RP) and a fixed point (EC-FP), modular exponentiation of a large number and that of a small number. Table 1 shows that both our hybrid protocol and its MSR- combined version require less processing time hence less power consumption of computing the link key.... In PAGE 11: ... We list the comparison results of our hybrid key establishment protocols with other public-key based key establishment protocols in Table 1, where computation complexity on sensor side is expressed in numbers of performing the cryptographic operations, including elliptic curve scalar multiplication of a random point (EC-RP) and a fixed point (EC-FP), modular exponentiation of a large number and that of a small number. Table1 shows that both our hybrid protocol and its MSR- combined version require less processing time hence less power consumption of computing the link key. The hybrid key establishment protocol also achieves the least bandwidth requirements, while its MSR-combined version has the least processing time but requires modest communication complexity compared with other public-key based key establishment protocols.... ..."

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### Table 2 Benchmarks for cryptographic operations

in for

"... In PAGE 9: ...1 GHz Pentium IV processor [30]. The processing times of the required cryptographic oper- ations, such as modular exponentiation, RSA decryption/signature and encryption/verification, are listed in Table2 . These benchmarks are also used to evaluate our PKC-based protocol later.... ..."

### Table 1 Properties of the cryptographic primitives

2001

"... In PAGE 3: ... Assumption (Black-box assumption). The axioms in Table1 are the only way in which a passive intruder can infer new knowledge from known data. Obviously, this is a rather strong assumption to make in practice, since in real-world cryptography, it is often possible to infer partial or statistical information about the content of a message, without necessarily understanding the entire message.... In PAGE 3: ... However, the black-box assumption is essential to our model, and in fact to most other logic-based models of cryptographic protocols. In addition to the general-purpose axioms shown in Table1 , there will also be protocol-speci c axioms. The intuition is that the general-purpose axioms capture all the ways in which a passive intruder can infer knowledge, namely by looking at data and analyzing it.... In PAGE 6: ... While this is a liveness property and not a security property, it is certainly important that a protocol should not be \over-speci ed quot; by relying on the principals to use information that they do not have access to. The reader may verify that in the presence of the axioms from Table1 , i(A; B) is logically derivable from K K A and K sA;B, while r(A; B) is logically derivable from K K B and K sA;B. Thus, any principal with knowledge of a private key can participate in this protocol.... In PAGE 6: ... Recall that the informal requirement was that the intruder should not be able to learn the secret sA;B for any honest principals A and B. Let be the set of axioms from Table1 . Let be the following... In PAGE 11: ...models, it follows that is intuitionistically provable. 2 Note that all axioms in Table1 are of Type 1, as are the protocol-speci c axioms. The formula is of Type 0.... ..."

Cited by 7