We propose several highly-practical and optimized constructions for joint signature and encryption primitives often referred to as signcryption. All our signcryption schemes, built directly from trapdoor permutations such as RSA, share features such as simplicity, efficiency, generality, near

We propose several highly-practical and optimized constructions for joint signature and encryption primitives often referred to as signcryption. All our signcryption schemes, built directly from trapdoor permutations such as RSA, share features such as simplicity, efficiency, generality, near

ABSTRACT We propose several highly-practical and optimized constructionsfor joint signature and encryption primitives often referred to as signcryption. All our signcryption schemes, built directly fromtrapdoor permutations such as RSA, share features such as simplicity, efficiency, generality

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Active networks allow their users to inject customized programs into the nodes of the network. An extreme case, in which we are most interested, replaces packets with "capsules" -- program fragments that are executed at each network router/switch they traverse. Active architectures permit a massive increase in the sophistication of the computation that is performed within the network. They will enable new applications, especially those based on application-specific multicast, information fusion, and other services that leverage network-based computation and storage. Furthermore, they will accelerate the pace of innovation by decoupling network services from the underlying hardware and allowing new services to be loaded into the infrastructure on demand. In this paper, we describe our vision of an active network architecture, outline our approach to its design, and survey the technologies that can be brought to bear on its implementation. We propose that the research community mount a j...

We study the interaction of the "new" construct with a rich but common form of (first-order) communication. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts. Specifically, we introduce a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value passing, primitive functions, and equations among terms. We develop semantics and proof techniques for this extended language and apply them in reasoning about some security protocols.

We study the Sign then Encrypt, Commit then Encrypt and Sign, and Encrypt then Sign paradigms in the context of three cryptographic primitives, namely designated confirmer signatures, signcryption, and verifiably encrypted signatures. Our study identifies weaknesses in those paradigms which impose

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Abstract. We revisit the topic of joint security for combined public key schemes, wherein a single keypair is used for both encryption and signature primitives in a secure manner. While breaking the principle of key separation, such schemes have attractive properties and are sometimes used

users to learn public keys and performance statistics of participating remailers, and we describe nymservers that allow users to maintain long-term pseudonyms using single-use reply blocks as a primitive. Our design integrates link encryption between remailers to provide forward anonymity. Mixminion