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Practical identitybased encryption without random oracles
 of LNCS
"... Abstract. We present an Identity Based Encryption (IBE) system that is fully secure in the standard model and has several advantages over previous such systems – namely, computational efficiency, shorter public parameters, and a “tight ” security reduction, albeit to a stronger assumption that depen ..."
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Cited by 140 (2 self)
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simple. It also provides recipient anonymity automatically, providing a second (and more efficient) solution to the problem of achieving anonymous IBE without random oracles. Finally, our proof of CCA2 security, which has more in common with the security proof for the CramerShoup encryption scheme than
Secure identitybased encryption in the quantum random oracle model
 In Proceedings of CRYPTO
, 2012
"... We give the first proof of security for an identitybased encryption scheme in the quantum random oracle model. This is the first proof of security for any scheme in this model that requires no additional assumptions. Our techniques are quite general and we use them to obtain security proofs for two ..."
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Cited by 8 (3 self)
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We give the first proof of security for an identitybased encryption scheme in the quantum random oracle model. This is the first proof of security for any scheme in this model that requires no additional assumptions. Our techniques are quite general and we use them to obtain security proofs
On the security of multiple encryption or CCAsecurity + CCAsecurity = CCAsecurity
 Proc. of PKC’04, LNCS 2947
, 2004
"... In a practical system, a message is often encrypted more than once by different encryptions, here called multiple encryption, to enhance its security. Additionally, new features may be achieved by multiple encrypting a message for a scheme, such as the keyinsulated cryptosystems [13] and anonymous ..."
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Cited by 3 (2 self)
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prove that this generic construction is in fact secure against MEwCCA by choosing all components INDCCA secure. We also give an efficient generic construction of keyinsulated cryptosystem, which is so far the first generic construction provably secure against CCA (in the random oracle model). key
Lecture 14 CCA Security
, 2007
"... Key exchange Suppose we have following situation: Alice wants to buy something from the well known website Bob.com Since they will exchange private information (Alice’s credit card, address etc.) they want to use encryption. However, they do not share a key between them. Using a key exchange protoco ..."
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key k ← R {0, 1} n and sends Ee(k) to Bob. A ⇆ B Bob and Alice can now can now continue their interaction with the shared secret key k. Insecurity of basic key exchange protocol: This protocol is secure for a passive / eavesdropping adversary, but it is not secure against an active adversary. Indeed
CCASecure Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption without Random Oracle
, 2006
"... We consider the problem of constructing a HIBE protocol which is secure in the full model against chosen ciphertext attacks without using random oracle. Known techniques (generic as well as nongeneric) convert an (h + 1)level CPAsecure HIBE protocol into an hlevel CCAsecure HIBE protocol. Ap ..."
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We consider the problem of constructing a HIBE protocol which is secure in the full model against chosen ciphertext attacks without using random oracle. Known techniques (generic as well as nongeneric) convert an (h + 1)level CPAsecure HIBE protocol into an hlevel CCAsecure HIBE protocol
Random Oracles in a Quantum World
"... Abstract. The interest in postquantum cryptography — classical systems that remain secure in the presence of a quantum adversary — has generated elegant proposals for new cryptosystems. Some of these systems are set in the random oracle model and are proven secure relative to adversaries that have ..."
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Cited by 16 (3 self)
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Abstract. The interest in postquantum cryptography — classical systems that remain secure in the presence of a quantum adversary — has generated elegant proposals for new cryptosystems. Some of these systems are set in the random oracle model and are proven secure relative to adversaries that have
On the Security of Multiple Encryption or CCAsecurity+CCAsecurity=CCAsecurity?
 Proc. of PKC’04, LNCS 2947
, 2003
"... In a practical system, a message is often encrypted more than once by different encryptions, here called multiple encryption, to enhance its security. Additionally, new features may be achieved by multiple encrypting a message for a scheme, such as the keyinsulated cryptosystems [13] and anonymous ..."
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Cited by 5 (1 self)
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In a practical system, a message is often encrypted more than once by different encryptions, here called multiple encryption, to enhance its security. Additionally, new features may be achieved by multiple encrypting a message for a scheme, such as the keyinsulated cryptosystems [13] and anonymous
On CCAsecure somewhat homomorphic encryption
 In Selected Areas in Cryptography
, 2011
"... Abstract. It is well known that any encryption scheme which supports any form of homomorphic operation cannot be secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. The question then arises as to what is the most stringent security definition which is achievable by homomorphic encryption schemes. Pri ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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1, indeed PA1, in the standard model assuming a lattice based knowledge assumption. We also examine the security of the scheme against another security notion, namely security in the presence of ciphertext validity checking oracles; and show why CCAlike notions are important in applications
Security of Encryption Schemes in Weakened Random Oracle Models
, 2010
"... Liskov proposed several weakened versions of the random oracle model, called weakened random oracle models (WROMs), to capture the vulnerability of ideal compression functions, which are expected to have the standard security of hash functions, i.e., collision resistance, secondpreimage resistance, ..."
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Liskov proposed several weakened versions of the random oracle model, called weakened random oracle models (WROMs), to capture the vulnerability of ideal compression functions, which are expected to have the standard security of hash functions, i.e., collision resistance, secondpreimage resistance
Random Oracles in a Quantum World
"... Abstract. Once quantum computers reach maturity most of today’s traditional cryptographic schemes based on RSA or discrete logarithms become vulnerable to quantumbased attacks. Hence, schemes which are more likely to resist quantum attacks like latticebased systems or codebased primitives have re ..."
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Cited by 5 (4 self)
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immune primitives and random oracles, such that the protocols are secure in the classical world, but insecure if a quantum attacker can access the random oracle via quantum states. We discuss that most of the proof techniques related to the random oracle model in the classical case cannot be transferred immediately
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