### Table 1: Summary of secret and public key attributes [4].

"... In PAGE 10: ... Table1 : Summary of secret and public key attributes [4].... In PAGE 14: ... In contrast to symmetric algorithms, asymmetric algorithms allow confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and nonrepudiation to be asymmetrically shared among key holders. Table1 shows a summary of the attributes of symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. Figure 3: Asymmetric cryptography [4].... ..."

### Table 4: Computation times for secret sharing and secret recovery of an 8 KB block using the XOR secret sharing scheme

2005

"... In PAGE 6: ... In practice, XOR secret sharing can be implemented with word-wide operations for efficiency. Table4 lists the computation times during secret sharing and secret recovery for a selection of (q, q) values for XOR secret sharing. Note that XOR secret sharing is also a perfect secret sharing scheme.... ..."

Cited by 8

### Table 1: Comparison between Pure Quorum Systems, Pure Secret Sharing, Method Regular- Sharing, and Method GridSharing for n = 44 and b = 3

2004

"... In PAGE 17: ... With only the quorum sizes being different, this slighty-modified secret sharing scheme and Method RegularSharing are identical. Table1 compares these methods in terms of different performance metrics when the number of servers in the system is 44 and the fault threshold is 3. In calculating the availabilities, it is assumed that a server can be compromised or crashed with a probability of 0.... ..."

Cited by 1

### Table 1: The summary of parameters used in the current challenge-response PCS secret shared key response key challenge response

2006

"... In PAGE 2: ...4 Generic Challenge-Response Based Protocol As we can see from the above described protocols, the crit- ical component in the challenge-response technique is that AS generates a challenge for MS and then waits for MS to send the corresponding response by hashing the challenge and the secret key shared with AS. Table1 shows the summary of the parameters used in the three challenge- response PCS. From Table 1, it is easy to find out that the secret shared keys between AS and MS play the critical role in the challenge-response protocol.... In PAGE 2: ... Table 1 shows the summary of the parameters used in the three challenge- response PCS. From Table1 , it is easy to find out that the secret shared keys between AS and MS play the critical role in the challenge-response protocol. Regardless to the proto- col GSM, DECT, or USDC, the response key is derived from the secret shared key.... ..."

### Table 6.1: A comparison of robust (m,n) threshold sharing schemes, showing the scheme type, whether the dealer or shareholders may be faulty, and whether m or n may be changed. Note that Desmedt and Jajodia [16] do not specify a phase for the initial distribution of shares of a secret.

2004

Cited by 4

### Table 1. Custom instructions for pairing-based cryptography.

"... In PAGE 9: ...2 Custom Instructions The extensions for pairing-based cryptography we propose in this paper include a total of five custom instructions to accelerate arithmetic operations in prime fields, binary fields, and ternary fields. Table1 gives an overview of the instruc-... In PAGE 10: ...ccumulator guarantees that up to 256 double-precision (i.e. 64-bit) products can be summed up without overflow or loss of precision, which is sufficient for cryp- tographic applications. Besides the custom instructions shown in Table1 , the MAC unit is also capable to execute the native SPARC multiply instructions like umul and smul [23]. Therefore, the proposed extensions for pairing-based cryptography can be easily integrated into the LEON-2 core by simply replacing... ..."

### Table 1. Custom instructions for pairing-based cryptography.

"... In PAGE 9: ...2 Custom Instructions The extensions for pairing-based cryptography we propose in this paper include a total of five custom instructions to accelerate arithmetic operations in prime fields, binary fields, and ternary fields. Table1 gives an overview of the instruc-... In PAGE 10: ...ccumulator guarantees that up to 256 double-precision (i.e. 64-bit) products can be summed up without overflow or loss of precision, which is sufficient for cryp- tographic applications. Besides the custom instructions shown in Table1 , the MAC unit is also capable to execute the native SPARC multiply instructions like umul and smul [23]. Therefore, the proposed extensions for pairing-based cryptography can be easily integrated into the LEON-2 core by simply replacing... ..."

### Table 1. A Secret Sharing Scheme for C6 S

1995

"... In PAGE 10: ... If we consider n = 6 and jSj = 2, then from the previous corollary we get that 2:5 (C6; 2) 3. Brickell and Stinson [12] gave the secret sharing scheme for C6 depicted in Table1 . It is easy to see that in this case the dealer apos;s randomness is log2 6 lt; 2:58497, and hence (C6; 2) log2 6.... ..."

Cited by 9

### Table 4. A secret-sharing scheme for AR,G.

2001

Cited by 4