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The Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol

by Chong Hee Kim, Gildas Avoine - In ICISC (2008
"... Abstract. Relay attacks are one of the most challenging threats RFID will have to face in the close future. They consist in making the verifier believe that the prover is in its close vicinity by surreptitiously forward-ing the signal between the verifier and an out-of-field prover. Distance boundin ..."
Abstract - Cited by 37 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
bounding protocols represent a promising way to thwart relay attacks, by measuring the round trip time of short authenticated messages. Sev-eral such protocols have been designed during the last years but none of them combine all the features one may expect in a RFID system. We introduce in this paper

RFID Distance Bounding Protocols

by Yu-ju Tu, Selwyn Piramuthu - In First International EURASIP Workshop on RFID Technology , 2007
"... Abstract – Almost all existing RFID tag/reader authentication protocols are vulnerable to mafia attacks and/or terrorist attacks from adversaries because of their inability to verify location of the tag. Several protocols have been proposed that purport to alleviate these forms of attacks. However, ..."
Abstract - Cited by 18 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
, vulnerabilities have been identified in most of these protocols. We present and evaluate a modified distance bounding protocol. I.

A Framework for Analyzing RFID Distance Bounding Protocols

by Gildas Avoine, Muhammed Ali, Benjamin Martin - Journal of Computer Security , 2011
"... Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been pro-posed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we in-troduce a unied framework that aims to im ..."
Abstract - Cited by 18 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been pro-posed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we in-troduce a unied framework that aims

A formal approach to distance-bounding RFID protocols

by Ulrich Dürholz, Marc Fischlin, Michael Kasper, Cristina Onete - In Information Security Conference (ISC) 2011, LNCS , 2011
"... Abstract. Distance-Bounding identification protocols aim at impeding man-in-themiddle attacks by measuring response times. There are three kinds of attacks such protocols could address: (1) Mafia attacks where the adversary relays communication between honest prover and honest verifier in different ..."
Abstract - Cited by 7 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Distance-Bounding identification protocols aim at impeding man-in-themiddle attacks by measuring response times. There are three kinds of attacks such protocols could address: (1) Mafia attacks where the adversary relays communication between honest prover and honest verifier in different

A power controlled multiple access protocol for wireless packet networks

by Jeffrey P. Monks, Vaduvur Bharghavan, Wen-mei W. Hwu , 2001
"... Abstract — Multiple access-based collision avoidance MAC protocols have typically used fixed transmission power, and have not considered power control mechanisms based on the distance of the transmitter and receiver in order to improve spatial channel reuse. This work proposes PCMA, a power controll ..."
Abstract - Cited by 242 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract — Multiple access-based collision avoidance MAC protocols have typically used fixed transmission power, and have not considered power control mechanisms based on the distance of the transmitter and receiver in order to improve spatial channel reuse. This work proposes PCMA, a power

RFID distance bounding protocol with mixed challenges to prevent relay attacks.

by Chong Hee Kim , Gildas Avoine - In The 8th International Conference on Cryptology And Network Security, CANS , 2009
"... Abstract-RFID systems suffer from different location-based attacks such as distance fraud, mafia fraud, and terrorist fraud. Among them mafia fraud is the most serious one as it can be mounted without the awareness of neither the reader nor the tag. In such an attack, the adversary acts as a man-in ..."
Abstract - Cited by 23 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
-in-themiddle who relays the signal between the two entities, possibly without knowing the specifications of the protocol used on the channel. Recently, distance bounding protocols measuring the round-trip times of messages exchanged between the reader and the tag have been designed to prevent this attack. Almost

A Formal Framework for Cryptanalyzing RFID Distance Bounding Protocols

by Gildas Avoine, Muhammed Ali Bingöl, Cédric Lauradoux, Benjamin Martin, et al. , 2009
"... Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for RFID technology have been proposed recently. However, the design and the analysis of these protocols are not based on a formal perspective. Motivated by this need, a formal framework is presented that helps the future attempts to cryptanalyze and des ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for RFID technology have been proposed recently. However, the design and the analysis of these protocols are not based on a formal perspective. Motivated by this need, a formal framework is presented that helps the future attempts to cryptanalyze

Shedding Light on RFID Distance Bounding Protocols and Terrorist Fraud Attacks

by Pedro Peris-lopez, Julio C. Hern, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Juan M. E. Tapiador , 2010
"... The vast majority of RFID authentication protocols assume the proximity between readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel. However, in real scenarios an intruder can be located between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick this last one into thinking that the prov ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
that the prover is in close proximity. This attack is generally known as a relay attack in which scope distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks are included. Distance bounding protocols represent a promising countermeasure to hinder relay attacks. Several protocols have been proposed during the last

Key Updates for RFID Distance-Bounding Protocols: Achieving Narrow-Destructive Privacy

by Cristina Onete, Tu Darmstadt
"... Abstract. Distance-bounding protocols address man-in-the-middle (MITM) in authentication protocols: by measuring response times, verifiers ensure that the responses are not purely relayed. Dürholz et al. [13] formalize the following attacks against distancebounding protocols: (1) mafia fraud, where ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. Distance-bounding protocols address man-in-the-middle (MITM) in authentication protocols: by measuring response times, verifiers ensure that the responses are not purely relayed. Dürholz et al. [13] formalize the following attacks against distancebounding protocols: (1) mafia fraud, where

Shedding Some Light on RFID Distance Bounding Protocols and Terrorist Attacks

by unknown authors , 2009
"... During the last years, researchers have focused on designing secure and efficient RFID authentication protocols. The vast majority of these protocols assume proximity between readers and tags due to the limited range of the radio channel. However, in real scenarios, an intruder can be located betwee ..."
Abstract - Add to MetaCart
between the prover (tag) and the verifier (reader) and trick the latter into thinking that the prover is in close proximity. This attack is globally known as a relay attack, a kind that includes others such as distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist attacks. Distance bounding protocols represent a
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