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465
On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
 In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
, 2004
"... We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of people from an algorithmic perspective. Fair division has been a central topic in the economic literature and several concepts of fairness have been suggested. The criterion that we focus on is the maximum envy between ..."
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Cited by 71 (3 self)
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We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of people from an algorithmic perspective. Fair division has been a central topic in the economic literature and several concepts of fairness have been suggested. The criterion that we focus on is the maximum envy between
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
 In Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of selfinterested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions — the Nash equilibria — may look quite differ ..."
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Cited by 281 (30 self)
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division scheme can be derived from the Shapley value, and has a number of basic economic motivations. We show that the price of stability for network design with respect to this fair cost allocation is O(log k), where k is the number of users, and that a good Nash equilibrium can be achieved via best
Distributed Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
, 2009
"... Distributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking central control, in which agents can locally agree on deals to exchange some of the goods in their possession. We study convergence properties for such distributed mechanisms when used as fair division procedures. Specifi ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Distributed mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods are mechanisms lacking central control, in which agents can locally agree on deals to exchange some of the goods in their possession. We study convergence properties for such distributed mechanisms when used as fair division procedures
Allocating Indivisible Goods
 ACM SIGECOM EXCHANGES
"... Given k players, m indivisible goods and a valuation function on the set of the goods for every player, Lipton, Markakis, Mossel and Saberi propose the MaxMin Fairness problem: partition the goods between the players such that the minimum value achieved by every player is maximized. We show that fo ..."
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Cited by 24 (1 self)
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Given k players, m indivisible goods and a valuation function on the set of the goods for every player, Lipton, Markakis, Mossel and Saberi propose the MaxMin Fairness problem: partition the goods between the players such that the minimum value achieved by every player is maximized. We show
An Approximation Algorithm for MaxMin Fair Allocation of Indivisible goods
 In Proc. of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
"... In this paper, we give the first approximation algorithm for the problem of maxmin fair allocation of indivisible goods. An instance of this problem consists of a set of k people and m indivisible goods. Each person has a known linear utility function over the set of goods which might be different ..."
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Cited by 59 (2 self)
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In this paper, we give the first approximation algorithm for the problem of maxmin fair allocation of indivisible goods. An instance of this problem consists of a set of k people and m indivisible goods. Each person has a known linear utility function over the set of goods which might be different
Indivisible goods and fiat money *
"... Abstract We study an economy where all goods entering preferences or production processes are indivisible. Fiat money is added as an additional perfectly divisible parameter which may, but which does not have to be used in order to facilitate exchange. Unlike the standard ArrowDebreu model, in our ..."
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, in our framework fiat money will have always a strictly positive price. Equilibrium allocations will change with the distribution of fiat money even though it does not directly yield utility through consumer preferences. Since a Walrasian equilibrium does not necessarily exist when goods are indivisible
Nobody Left Behind: Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
"... Abstract. The MaxMin Fairness problem is as follows: Given m indivisible goods and k players, each with a specified valuation function on the subsets of the goods, how should the goods be split between the players so as to maximize the minimum valuation. Viewing the problem from a game theoretic pe ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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Abstract. The MaxMin Fairness problem is as follows: Given m indivisible goods and k players, each with a specified valuation function on the subsets of the goods, how should the goods be split between the players so as to maximize the minimum valuation. Viewing the problem from a game theoretic
On Approximately Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods General Terms
"... ABSTRACT We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of people from an algorithmic perspective. Fair division has been a central topic in the economic literature and several concepts of fairness have been suggested. The criterion that we focus on is envyfreeness. ..."
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ABSTRACT We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of people from an algorithmic perspective. Fair division has been a central topic in the economic literature and several concepts of fairness have been suggested. The criterion that we focus on is envy
Results 1  10
of
465