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Symmetry in Network Congestion Games: Pure Equilibria and Anarchy Cost
 In Proc. of the 3rd Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA ’05
, 2005
"... Abstract. We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays o ..."
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Cited by 19 (6 self)
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Abstract. We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays
The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games
 In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... Abstract We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linearlatency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is \Theta (p N),where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games andfor both max ..."
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Cited by 165 (6 self)
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Abstract We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linearlatency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is \Theta (p N),where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games andfor both
How bad is selfish routing?
 JOURNAL OF THE ACM
, 2002
"... We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route t ..."
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Cited by 678 (27 self)
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its traffic on the minimumlatency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a “selfishly motivated ” assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING SOCIETY NEWSLETTER
, 2007
"... Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how selfinterested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure of this in ..."
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Cited by 252 (11 self)
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Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how selfinterested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games
, 2005
"... ..."
Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games
"... Abstract. Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium. Weighted variants of congestion games that ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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that rely on sharing costs proportional to players ’ weights do not generally have purestrategy Nash equilibria. We propose a new way of assigning costs to players with weights in congestion games that recovers the important properties of the unweighted model. This method is derived from the Shapley value
Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
, 2008
"... Strong Nash equilibria and Paretooptimal Nash equilibria are natural and important strengthenings of the Nash equilibrium concept. We study these stronger notions of equilibrium in congestion games, focusing on the relationships between the price of anarchy for these equilibria and that for standar ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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Strong Nash equilibria and Paretooptimal Nash equilibria are natural and important strengthenings of the Nash equilibrium concept. We study these stronger notions of equilibrium in congestion games, focusing on the relationships between the price of anarchy for these equilibria
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES
, 2002
"... We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to ..."
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Cited by 219 (16 self)
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We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed
The Price of Anarchy in Bertrand Games
"... The Internet is composed of multiple economicallyindependent service providers that sell bandwidth in their networks so as to maximize their own revenue. Users, on the other hand, route their traffic selfishly to maximize their own utility. How does this selfishness impact the efficiency of operati ..."
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Cited by 7 (3 self)
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—the total value obtained by all the traffic routed. Unlike recent work on network pricing, in our pricing game users do not face congestion costs; instead service providers must ensure that capacity constraints on their links are satisfied. Our model extends the classic Bertrand game in economics to network
Results 1  10
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1,695