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191,059
Strongly polynomialtime truthful mechanisms in one shot
 In Proc. of the International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. One of the main challenges in algorithmic mechanism design is to turn (existing) efficient algorithmic solutions into efficient truthful mechanisms. Building a truthful mechanism is indeed a difficult process since the underlying algorithm must obey certain “monotonicity ” properties and s ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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and suitable payment functions need to be computed (this task usually represents the bottleneck in the overall time complexity). We provide a general technique for building truthful mechanisms that provide optimal solutions in strongly polynomial time. We show that the entire mechanism can be obtained if one
Truthful Mechanisms for OneParameter Agents
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
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Cited by 232 (3 self)
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secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments. We use our characterization to design polynomial time truthful mechanisms for several
Polynomialtime compilation of SelfExplanatory Simulators
"... Abstract: Selfexplanatory simulators have many potential applications, including supporting engineering activities, intelligent tutoring systems, and computerbased training systems.Yet compilation methods have been too slow for largescale systems, interpreterbased strategies are restricted to ru ..."
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to running on large computers with expensive commercial software, and neither technology has been shown to scale to very large systems. This paper describes an algorithm for compiling selfexplanatory simulators that operates in polynomial time. It is capable of constructing selfexplanatory simulators
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
 In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’00
, 2000
"... A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore comp ..."
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Cited by 216 (6 self)
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the above problem. We introduce a modification of VCGbased mechanisms in which the agents are given a chance to improve the output of the underlying algorithm. When the agents behave truthfully, the welfare obtained by the mechanism is at least as good as the one obtained by the algorithm’s output. We
TRUTH
"... The hypothesis of Germany’s Guilt for the Second World War is refuted. Future historical research could, if need be, amplify the facts compiled in this book, but it can no longer prove them nonexistent. There is available to the public today a considerable number of documents, both from home and ab ..."
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the outbreak of the War in 1939. One can assume with an almost virtual certainty that the Victor Powers, starting in 1945, have sifted through the German archives for all the documents incriminating Germany, and during the following twenty years have utilized and published them. It is, therefore
The Class NP Nondeterministic polynomialtime
"... A language L (equivalently decision problem) is in the class P if there is a polynomial time algorithm A for deciding L; Given a string x, A correctly decides if x ∈ L and running time of A on x is polynomial in x, the length of x. Given a contextfree grammar and a string, can that string be g ..."
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A language L (equivalently decision problem) is in the class P if there is a polynomial time algorithm A for deciding L; Given a string x, A correctly decides if x ∈ L and running time of A on x is polynomial in x, the length of x. Given a contextfree grammar and a string, can that string
Shot
, 2001
"... noise in superconducting junctions with weak link formed by Anderson impurity ..."
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noise in superconducting junctions with weak link formed by Anderson impurity
Shot
"... ©1993 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other wo ..."
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©1993 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
 IN STOC
, 2006
"... We design two computationallyefficient incentivecompatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentivecompatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion o ..."
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Cited by 105 (17 self)
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of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O(pm)approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations  this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log2 m) approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations
Results 1  10
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191,059