Studies of the phenomenon of rumour can no longer avoid paying particular atten-tion to recent transformations of structures in the public sphere. On the one hand, the central role of media in the classification of items of information as ‘rumours ’ and in their subsequent publicization

Social media is a rich source of rumours and corresponding community reactions. Rumours reflect different characteristics, some shared and some individual. We for-mulate the problem of classifying tweet level judgements of rumours as a super-vised learning task. Both supervised and unsupervised

Abstract. PHEME attempts to identify four kinds of false claim in social media and on the web, in real time: rumours, disinformation, misinformation and spec-ulation. This brings challenges in modelling the behaviour of individual users, networks of users and information diffusion

efficient with respect to bad news but not with respect to good news. When subjects were allowed to communicate uncertain information to create a climate of rumour (they could lie, tell the truth and/or spread rumours but were forbidden to prove the veracity of any communication) there was a decrease

Although every effort is made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of material published in this Working Paper, the Crisis States Research Centre and LSE accept no responsibility for the veracity of claims or accuracy of information provided by contributors. All rights reserved. No part

Although every effort is made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of material published in this Working Paper, the Crisis States Research Centre and LSE accept no responsibility for the veracity of claims or accuracy of information provided by contributors. All rights reserved. No part

in the transition from conflict in Northern Ireland. Based on that experience, it develops four heuristic models regarding informers that the paper argues may be of direct relevance to other conflicted and transitional so-cieties. These are the informer as folk devil, the informer as rumour, the informer

USA are trademarks and Gale is a registered trademark used herein under license. For more information, contact

These late lustration policies expanded the scope and transparency measures associated with lustration as a form of transitional justice. While early lustration measures targeted political elites, late lustration policies include public and private sector positions, such as journalists, academics, business leaders, and others in ‘positions of public trust’. Given the legal controversy and moral complexity surrounding lustration, why lustrate so late in the post-communist transition and why expand the policies? The dominant explanation is that lustration is a tool of party politics and is a threat to democratic consolidation. However, the late lustration programmes do not fit this hypothesis neatly. The new laws have been restructured and packaged with other reform programmes, specifically anticorruption programmes. Late lustration has evolved to include economic and social, as well as political concerns. As such, some post-communist governments in Central and Eastern Europe appear to be trying to use lustration as a way to further the democratic transitions by addressing remaining public concerns about corruption, distrust, and inequality.

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,