through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.

This paper presents a certification mechanism for verifying the secure flow of information through a program. Because it exploits the properties of a lattice structure among security classes, the procedure is sufficiently simple that it can easily be included in the analysis phase of most existing

view of all systems that restrict information flow, enables a classification of them according to security objectives, and suggests some new approaches. It also leads to the construction of automatic program certification mechanisms for verifying the secure flow of information through a program.

and subsequently whmh data sets an active user may read or wrote. Flow controls regulate the dissemination of values among the data sets accessible to a user. Inference controls protect statistical databases by preventing questioners from deducing confidential information by posing carefully designed sequences

A promising technique for protecting privacy and integrity of sensitive data is to statically check information flow within programs that manipulate the data. While previous work has proposed programming language extensions to allow this static checking, the resulting languages are too restrictive

This tutorial paper explores the mechanics of protecting computer-stored information from unauthorized use or modification. It concentrates on those architectural structures--whether hardware or software--that are necessary to support information protection. The paper develops in three main

This paper gives the main definitions relating to dependability, a generic concept including as special case such attributes as reliability, availability, safety, integrity, maintainability, etc. Security brings in concerns for confidentiality, in addition to availability and integrity. Basic

anddesig considerations. This is the first such analysis of secure routing in sensor networks.

Semantic analysis of programs is essential in optimizing compilers and program verification systems. It encompasses data flow analysis, data type determination, generation of approximate invariant

involve hundreds of processes that must be able to acquire resources dynamically and communicate e#ciently. This paper analyzes the unique security requirements of large-scale distributed (grid) computing and develops a security policy and a corresponding security architecture. An implementation