Are Americans more individualistic and less collectivistic than members of other groups? The authors summarize plausible psychological implications of individualism–collectivism (IND-COL), meta-analyze cross-national and within-United States IND-COL differences, and review evidence for effects of IND-COL on self-concept, well-being, cognition, and relationality. European Americans were found to be both more individualistic—valuing personal independence more—and less collectivistic—feeling duty to in-groups less—than others. However, European Americans were not more individualistic than African Americans, or Latinos, and not less collectivistic than Japanese or Koreans. Among Asians, only Chinese showed large effects, being both less individualistic and more collectivistic. Moderate IND-COL effects were found on self-concept and relationality, and large effects were found on attribution and cognitive style. To contemporary Americans, being an individualist is not only a good thing; it is a quintessentially American thing. However, the term individualism itself appears to have its roots outside of the North American continent, namely in the French Revolution. It appears that individualism was first used to describe the negative

This article presents a theory of how different types of discrepancies between self-state representa-tions are related to different kinds of emotional vulnerabilities. One domain of the self (actual; ideal; ought) and one standpoint on the self (own; significant other) constitute each type of self-state representation. It is proposed that different types of self-discrepancies represent different types of negative psychological situations that are associated with different kinds of discomfort. Discrepan-cies between the actual/own self-state (i.e., the self-concept) and ideal self-stales (i.e., representations of an individual's beliefs about his or her own or a significant other's hopes, wishes, or aspirations for the individual) signify the absence of positive outcomes, which is associated with dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness). In contrast, discrepancies between the ac-tual/own self-state and ought self-states (i.e., representations of an individual's beliefs about his or her own or a significant other's beliefs about the individual's duties, responsibilities, or obligations) signify the presence of negative outcomes, which is associated with agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, threat, restlessness). Differences in both the relative magnitude and the accessibility of individu-als ' available types of self-discrepancies are predicted to be related to differences in the kinds of discomfort people are likely to experience. Correlational and experimental evidence supports the predictions of the model. Differences between serf-discrepancy theory and (a) other theories of in-compatible self-beliefs and (b) actual self negativity (e.g., low self-esteem) are discussed. The notion that people who hold conflicting or incompatible beliefs are likely to experience discomfort has had a long history in psychology. In social psychology, for example, various early theories proposed a relation between discomfort and specific kinds of "inconsistency " among a person's beliefs (e.g., Abelson

The technology for building knowledge-based systems by inductive inference from examples has been demonstrated successfully in several practical applications. This paper summarizes an approach to synthesizing decision trees that has been used in a variety of systems, and it describes one such system, ID3, in detail. Results from recent studies show ways in which the methodology can be modified to deal with information that is noisy and/or incomplete. A reported shortcoming of the basic algorithm is discussed and two means of overcoming it are compared. The paper concludes with illustrations of current research directions.

Trust is a judgement of unquestionable utility — as humans we use it every day of our lives. However, trust has suffered from an imperfect understanding, a plethora of definitions, and informal use in the literature and in everyday life. It is common to say “I trust you, ” but what does that mean? This thesis provides a clarification of trust. We present a formalism for trust which provides us with a tool for precise discussion. The formalism is implementable: it can be embedded in an artificial agent, enabling the agent to make trust-based decisions. Its applicability in the domain of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) is raised. The thesis presents a testbed populated by simple trusting agents which substantiates the utility of the formalism. The formalism provides a step in the direction of a proper understanding and definition of human trust. A contribution of the thesis is its detailed exploration of the possibilities of future work in the area. Summary 1. Overview This thesis presents an overview of trust as a social phenomenon and discusses it formally. It argues that trust is: • A means for understanding and adapting to the complexity of the environment. • A means of providing added robustness to independent agents. • A useful judgement in the light of experience of the behaviour of others. • Applicable to inanimate others. The thesis argues these points from the point of view of artificial agents. Trust in an artificial agent is a means of providing an additional tool for the consideration of other agents and the environment in which it exists. Moreover, a formalisation of trust enables the embedding of the concept into an artificial agent. This has been done, and is documented in the thesis. 2. Exposition There are places in the thesis where it is necessary to give a broad outline before going deeper. In consequence it may seem that the subject is not receiving a thorough treatment, or that too much is being discussed at one time! (This is particularly apparent in the first and second chapters.) To present a thorough understanding of trust, we have proceeded breadth first in the introductory chapters. Chapter 3 expands, depth first, presenting critical views of established researchers.

Cognitive radio is viewed as a novel approach for improving the utilization of a precious natural resource: the radio electromagnetic spectrum. The cognitive radio, built on a software-defined radio, is defined as an intelligent wireless communication system that is aware of its environment and uses the methodology of understanding-by-building to learn from the environment and adapt to statistical variations in the input stimuli, with two primary objectives in mind: • highly reliable communication whenever and wherever needed; • efficient utilization of the radio spectrum. Following the discussion of interference temperature as a new metric for the quantification and management of interference, the paper addresses three fundamental cognitive tasks. 1) Radio-scene analysis. 2) Channel-state estimation and predictive modeling. 3) Transmit-power control and dynamic spectrum management. This paper also discusses the emergent behavior of cognitive radio.

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The central proposal of this article is that verbal reports are data. Accounting for verbal reports, as for other kinds of data, requires explication of the mech-anisms by which the reports are generated, and the ways in which they are sensitive to experimental factors (instructions, tasks, etc.). Within the theoret-ical framework of human information processing, we discuss different types of processes underlying verbalization and present a model of how subjects, in re-sponse to an instruction to think aloud, verbalize information that they are attending to in short-term memory (STM). Verbalizing information is shown to affect cognitive processes only if the instructions require verbalization of information that would not otherwise be attended to. From an analysis of what would be in STM at the time of report, the model predicts what can reliably be reported. The inaccurate reports found by other research are shown to result from requesting information that was never directly heeded, thus forcing subjects to infer rather than remember their mental processes. After a long period of time during which stimulus-response relations were at the focus of attention, research in psychology is now seeking to understand in detail the mecha-nisms and internal structure of cognitive pro-cesses that produce these relations. In the limiting case, we would like to have process models so explicit that they could actually produce the predicted behavior from the in-formation in the stimulus.

of relationships consumers form with brands; and (3) inducts from the data the concept of brand relationship quality, a diagnostic tool for conceptualizing and evaluating relation-ship strength. Three in-depth case studies inform this agenda, their interpretation guided by an integrative review of the literature