and Stephen Trejo for useful comments, and to the National Sci-ence Foundation for research support. 1.

Explaining cross-country differences in growth rates requires not only an understanding of the link between growth and public policies, but also an understanding of why countries choose different public policies. This paper shows that ethnic diversity helps explain cross-country differences in public policies, political stability, and other economic indicators. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, economic growth is associated with low schooling, political instability, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits, and insufficient infrastructure. Africa’s high ethnic fragmentation explains a significant part of most of these characteristics.

This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the qual-ity of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the mid-dle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protec-tions, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share-holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights. I. Overview of the Issues In the traditional finance of Modigliani and Miller (1958), securities are recognized by their cash flows. For example, debt has a fixed promised stream of interest payments, whereas equity entitles its

Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of financial markets, and in the access of firms to external finance. We suggest that there is a common element to the explanations of these differences, namely how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, summarize the consequences of these differences, and suggest potential strategies of reform of corporate governance. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.

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The classification rules induced by machine learning systems are judged by two criteria: their classification accuracy on an independent test set (henceforth "accuracy"), and their complexity. The relationship between these two criteria is, of course, of keen interest to the machine learning community. There are in the literature some indications that very simple rules may achieve surprisingly high accuracy on many datasets. For example, Rendell occasionally remarks that many real world datasets have "few peaks (often just one) " and so are "easy to learn" (Rendell & Seshu, 1990, p.256). Similarly, Shavlik et al. (1991) report that, with certain qualifications, "the accuracy of the perceptron is hardly distinguishable from the more complicated learning algorithms " (p.134). Further evidence is provided by studies of pruning methods (e.g. Buntine & Niblett, 1992; Clark & Niblett, 1989; Mingers, 1989), where accuracy is rarely seen to decrease as pruning becomes more severe (for example, see Table 1) 1. This is so even when rules are pruned to the extreme, as happened with the "Err-comp " pruning method in Mingers (1989). This method produced the most accurate decision trees, and in four of the five domains studied these trees had only 2 or 3 leaves

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We exploit differences in early colonial experience to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Our argument is that Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. The choice of colonization strategy was, at least in part, determined by the feasibility of whether Europeans could settle in the colony. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and they were more likely to set up worse (extractive) institutions. These early institutions persisted to the present. We document these hypotheses in the data. Exploiting differences in mortality rates faced by soldiers, bishops and sailors in the colonies during the 18th and 19th centuries as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Our estimates imply that a change from the worst (Zaire) to the best (US or New Zealand) institutions in our sample would be associated with a five fold increase in income per capita.

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