Results 1  10
of
19
Program equilibria and discounted computation time
 Center for
, 2008
"... Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite twoplayer game where each player can base their strategy on the other player’s strategies. Tennenholtz’s model allowed each player to produce a “loopfree ” computer program that had access to the code for both players. H ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
equilibrium using general computational models and discounting the payoffs based on the computation time used. We give an even more general folk theorem giving correlatedstrategy payoffs down to the pure minimax of each player. We also show the existence of equilibrium in other games not covered
Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time
"... Abstract: Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the hardness of factoring. We define a new notion of bou ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
of bounded rationality, where the payoffs of players are discounted by the computation time they take to produce their actions. We use this notion to give a direct correspondence between the existence of equilibria where Alice has a winning strategy and the hardness of factoring. Namely, under a natural
Nonconstant discounting in continuous time
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2007
"... This note derives the dynamic programming equation (DPE) to a differentiable Markov Perfect equilibrium in a problem with nonconstant discounting and general functional forms. We begin with a discrete stage model and take the limit as the length of the stage goes to 0 to obtain the DPE correspondin ..."
Abstract

Cited by 23 (5 self)
 Add to MetaCart
corresponding to the continuous time problem. We characterize the multiplicity of equilibria under nonconstant discounting and discuss the relation between a given equilibrium of that model and the unique equilibrium of a related problem with constant discounting. We calculate the bounds of the set
Existence, uniqueness, and computational theory for time consistent equilibria: A hyperbolic discounting example
, 2004
"... We present an asymptotically valid analysis of a simple optimal growth model with hyperbolic discounting. We use the implicit function theorem for Banach spaces to show that for small deviations from exponential discounting there is a unique solution near the exponential discounting solution in the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
that the techniques can be used for a wide variety of time consistency problems. We also compare the computational procedure implied by our asymptotic analysis to previous methods. Finally, we present a simple tax policy example that illustrates how to apply the method more generally. 1
I would like to thank Paul Klein for a helpful conversation regarding the KKS procedure Existence, Uniqueness, and Computational Theory for Time Consistent Equilibria: A Hyperbolic Discounting Example
, 2003
"... We present asymptotically valid analyses of a simple optimal growth model with hyperbolic discounting. We use the implicit function theorem for Banach spaces to show that for small hyperbolicity there is a unique solution in the Banach space of consumption functions with bounded derivatives. The pro ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
. The proof is constructive and produces both an infinite series characterization and a perturbation method for solving these problems. The solution uses only the contraction properties of the exponential discounting case, suggesting that the techniques can be used for a wide variety of time consistency
MULTIPLE SOLUTIONS UNDER QUASIEXPONENTIAL DISCOUNTING
, 2009
"... We consider a group or committee that faces a binary decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information. Members agree which decision should be taken in each state of nature, had this been known, but they may attach different values to the two types of mistake that may occur. Mos ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
preference for esteem. We also show that a slight probability for voting mistakes strengthens the incentive for informative voting. timeconsistency, hyperbolic discounting, stochastic dynamic programming, multiplicity, uniqueness. Classification JEL:
An Approximate SubgamePerfect Equilibrium Computation Technique for Repeated Games
"... This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgameperfect equilibria (SPE) in repeated games with discounting. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE payoff profiles. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned on t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper presents a technique for approximating, up to any precision, the set of subgameperfect equilibria (SPE) in repeated games with discounting. The process starts with a single hypercube approximation of the set of SPE payoff profiles. Then the initial hypercube is gradually partitioned
Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax
 Journal of Public Economics
, 1983
"... This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes, the US ..."
Abstract

Cited by 26 (10 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes
Polynomial stochastic games via sum of squares optimization 1
, 806
"... Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state twoplayer zerosum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards. The players are assumed to have infinite strategy spaces and ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Stochastic games are an important class of problems that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state twoplayer zerosum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards. The players are assumed to have infinite strategy spaces
Multiissue negotiation with deadlines
 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
"... This paper studies bilateral multiissue negotiation between selfinterested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simu ..."
Abstract

Cited by 24 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
. Specifically, we consider this question for a model in which the agents have time constraints (in the form of both deadlines and discount factors) and information uncertainty (in that the agents do not know the opponent’s utility function). For this model, we consider issues that are both independent and those
Results 1  10
of
19