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Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue
, 2014
"... This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of BayesNash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with singledimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates the standard smoothness framework [e.g., 16] into ..."
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This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of BayesNash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with singledimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates the standard smoothness framework [e.g., 16
Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. The American Economic Review,
, 1977
"... The basic issue concerning production in welfare economics is whether a market solution will yield the socially optimum kinds and quantities of commodities. It is well known that problems can arise for three broad reasons: distributive justice; external effects; and scale economies. This paper is c ..."
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Cited by 1911 (5 self)
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is concerned with the last of these. The basic principle is easily stated.' A commodity should be produced if the costs can be covered by the sum of revenues and a properly defined measure of consumer's surplus. The optimum amount is then found by equating the demand price and the marginal cost
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING SOCIETY NEWSLETTER
, 2007
"... Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how selfinterested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure of this in ..."
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Cited by 255 (11 self)
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Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how selfinterested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
 JOURNAL OF COMPUTER AND SYSTEM SCIENCES
, 2002
"... We study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncooperative network users. We consider a model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the network is a function of the edge congestion, and network users are assumed to ..."
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Cited by 217 (17 self)
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network performance. We quantify this degradation in network performance via the price of anarchy, the worstpossible ratio between the total latency of a Nash equilibrium and of an optimal routing of the traffic. We show the price of anarchy is determined only by the simplest of networks. Specifically
The Price of Anarchy in Bertrand Games
"... The Internet is composed of multiple economicallyindependent service providers that sell bandwidth in their networks so as to maximize their own revenue. Users, on the other hand, route their traffic selfishly to maximize their own utility. How does this selfishness impact the efficiency of operati ..."
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Cited by 7 (3 self)
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of operation of the network? To answer this question we consider a twostage network pricing game where service providers first select prices to charge on their links, and users then pick paths to route their traffic. We give tight bounds on the price of anarchy of the game with respect to social value
The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games
 In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... Abstract We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linearlatency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is \Theta (p N),where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games andfor both max ..."
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Cited by 165 (6 self)
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Abstract We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linearlatency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is \Theta (p N),where N is the number of players. For all other cases of symmetric or asymmetric games andfor both
Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy
 STOC'09
, 2009
"... The price of anarchy (POA) is a worstcase measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome. This measure implicitly assumes that players successfully reach some Nash equilibrium ..."
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Cited by 101 (12 self)
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The price of anarchy (POA) is a worstcase measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome. This measure implicitly assumes that players successfully reach some Nash
Strong Price of Anarchy
"... A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong equilibrium to the social optimum. In contrast to the traditional price of anarchy, which quantifies the loss i ..."
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Cited by 73 (10 self)
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A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong equilibrium to the social optimum. In contrast to the traditional price of anarchy, which quantifies the loss
Pricing in Computer Networks: Reshaping the Research Agenda
 ACM Computer Communication Review
, 1996
"... As the Internet makes the transition from research testbed to commercial enterprise, the topic of pricing in computer networks has suddenly attracted great attention. Much of the discussion in the network design community and the popular press centers on the usagebased vs. fiat pricing debate. The ..."
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Cited by 236 (2 self)
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. The more academic literature has largely focused on devising optimal pricing policies; achieving optimal welfare requires charging marginal congestion costs for usage. In this paper we critique this optimality paradigm on three grounds: (1) marginal cost prices may not produce sufficient revenue to fully
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