In a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information we show that the optimal, incentive-compatible debt contract is the standard debt contract. The second-best level of investment never exceeds the first-best and is strictly less when there is a positive probability of costly

In this paper, we take a novel approach at service differentiation in packet-switched networks. Existing mechanisms for delay control and differentiation typically require some form of explicit resource allocation and consequently, admission control. We propose incentive-compatible differentiated

present fundamental theorems for non-priority M/G/1 queues, nonpreemptive M/G/1 queues, and preemptive-resume M/G/1 queues. For non-priority M/G/1 queues and nonpreemptive M/G/1 queues, these theorems establish optimal assignment rules and incentivecompatible pricing schemes. For preemptive-resume M/G/1

the Internet to provide service differentiation. Most of the existing proposals require additional access-control mechanisms, such as admission control and pricing, which are complicated to implement and render these proposals not incrementally deployable. Incentive-compatible Differentiated Scheduling (ICDS

We propose an optimization approach to flow control where the objective is to maximize the aggregate source utility over their transmission rates. We view network links and sources as processors of a distributed computation system to solve the dual problem using gradient projection algorithm

critical data. In a network with enhancements for QoS support, pricing of network services based on the level of service, usage, and congestion provides a natural and equitable incentive for multimedia applications to adapt their sending rates according to network conditions. We have developed

time and all other standard heap operations in o ( 1) amortized time. Using F-heaps we are able to obtain improved running times for several network optimization algorithms. In particular, we obtain the following worst-case bounds, where n is the number of vertices and m the number of edges

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!ink, it is shown that the provider can enforce any operating point it deems eficient by oflering the capacity of the various links at discount prices. The incentive compatible discount vector is shown to be unique to the extent of a multiplicative constant, and its structure is specified explicitly. An adaptive

's profits, once projects have begun. The firm's portfolio choice of borrowing source and the choice of priority for its debt claims attempt to optimally circumscribe the powers of banks.