Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker

Non-Interference in language based security, by explaining how it models both the weakening of attackers ’ observational capability, and the non-interference we model both attackers that can only observe properties of public data, and private properties that can or cannot flow. Moreover, we deepen

Abstract. In this paper we introduce a compositional proof-system for certifying abstract non-interference in programming languages. Certifying abstract noninterference means proving that no unauthorized flow of information is observable by the attacker from confidential to public data

Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a timed notion of abstract non-interference. This is obtained by considering semantics which observe time elapsed in computations. Timing channels can be modeled in this way either by letting the attacker to observe time as a public variable or reckon the time

Note on a simple type system for

We address the problem of characterising the security of a program against unauthorised information flows. Classical approaches are based on non-interference models which depend ultimately on the notion of process equivalence. In these models confidentiality is an absolute property stating

The information security community has long debated the exact definition of the term `security'. Even if we focus on the more modest notion of confidentiality the precise definition remains controversial. In their seminal paper [4], Goguen and Meseguer took an important step towards a

property of its semantics. This provides a comprehensive account of non-interference features for language-based security. We introduce systematic methods for extracting attackers from programs, providing domain-theoretic characterizations of the most precise attackers which cannot violate the security

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of statistical queries and correlating the responses. Statlstmal data banks are much less secure than most people beheve. Data encryption attempts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information in transit or m storage. This paper describes the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds