Non-Interference in language based security, by explaining how it models both the weakening of attackers ’ observational capability, and the non-interference we model both attackers that can only observe properties of public data, and private properties that can or cannot flow. Moreover, we deepen

Abstract. In this paper we introduce a compositional proof-system for certifying abstract non-interference in programming languages. Certifying abstract noninterference means proving that no unauthorized flow of information is observable by the attacker from confidential to public data

Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a timed notion of abstract non-interference. This is obtained by considering semantics which observe time elapsed in computations. Timing channels can be modeled in this way either by letting the attacker to observe time as a public variable or reckon the time

property of its semantics. This provides a comprehensive account of non-interference features for language-based security. We introduce systematic methods for extracting attackers from programs, providing domain-theoretic characterizations of the most precise attackers which cannot violate the security

We address the problem of characterising the security of a program against unauthorised information flows. Classical approaches are based on non-interference models which depend ultimately on the notion of process equivalence. In these models confidentiality is an absolute property stating

rates, r 10 t . To capture potential non-linear effects due to convexity, we also include the squared level of the term structure, (r 10 t ) 2 . Slope of Yield Curve We define the slope of the yield curve as the difference between Datastream's 10-year and 2-year Benchmark Treasury yields, slope

Abstract. We consider the problem of defining an appropriate notion of non-interference (NI) for deterministic interactive programs. Previous work on the security of interactive programs by O’Neill, Clarkson and Chong (CSFW 2006) builds on earlier ideas due to Wittbold and Johnson (Symposium

The standard approach to the specification of a secure system is to present a (usually state-hased) abstract security model separately from the specification of the system's functional n:quirements, and establishing a correspondence between the two specifications. This complex treatment has

Abstract. Non–interference is a semantic program property that assigns confidentiality levels to data objects and prevents illicit information flows from occurring from high to low security levels. In this paper, we present a novel security model for global non–interference which approximates non–interference

Abstract. In recent times information flow and non-interference have become very popular concepts for expressing both integrity and privacy properties. We present the first general definition of probabilistic non-interference in reactive systems which includes a computational case. This case