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Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches
, 1999
"... In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders may bid for arbitrary combinations of goods. Determining the outcome of such an auction is an optimization problem that is NPcomplete in the general case. We propose two methods of overcoming this apparent intractability. ..."
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Cited by 288 (9 self)
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quickly and offers good anytime performance, and (b) in many cases our second method, despite lacking guarantees regarding optimality or running time, quickly reaches solutions that are nearly optimal. 1 Combinatorial Auctions Auction theory has received increasing attention from computer scientists
NearOptimal Online Auctions
 In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
, 2005
"... Abstract We consider the online auction problem proposed byBarYossef, Hildrum, and Wu [4] in which an auctioneer is selling identical items to bidders arriving one at atime. We give an auction that achieves a constant factor of the optimal profit less an O(h) additive loss term,where h is the value ..."
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Cited by 49 (11 self)
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Abstract We consider the online auction problem proposed byBarYossef, Hildrum, and Wu [4] in which an auctioneer is selling identical items to bidders arriving one at atime. We give an auction that achieves a constant factor of the optimal profit less an O(h) additive loss term,where h
Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
 In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC’00
, 2000
"... A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore comp ..."
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Cited by 216 (6 self)
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A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG. When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: VCG mechanisms are required to compute optimal outcomes and are therefore
Nearly optimal multi attribute auctions
 In EC ’05: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
, 2005
"... In almost every procurement situation, nonprice attributes of the items to be purchased play a crucial role. Procurement protocols which take these attributes into account are called multiattribute auctions. We study the following problem called optimal multiattribute auction design: A buyer want ..."
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Cited by 9 (1 self)
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is to design an auction which maximizes the expected utility of the buyer. This paper offers a generic method for the construction of nearly optimal multiattribute auctions. The computational time of our mechanisms equals the time required for computing (or approximating) the optimal mechanism on a small
Approximating Optimal Auctions
, 2005
"... We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to sell an item to a group of selfinterested agents. Each agent i has a privately known value for winning the object. Given a joint distribution of these values, the goal is to construct an optimal auct ..."
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Cited by 46 (2 self)
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auction, i.e. a truth revealing protocol that maximizes the seller’s expected revenue. We introduce a novel generic method for the construction of nearoptimal auctions that satisfy expost individual rationality. Our method guarantees an expected revenue of at least 1/2 of the optimum for any given
Near Optimal Nontruthful Auctions
"... In several ecommerce applications, nontruthful auctions have been preferred over truthful weakly dominant strategy ones partly because of their simplicity and scalability. Although nontruthful auctions can have weaker incentive constraints than truthful ones, the question of how much more revenue ..."
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In several ecommerce applications, nontruthful auctions have been preferred over truthful weakly dominant strategy ones partly because of their simplicity and scalability. Although nontruthful auctions can have weaker incentive constraints than truthful ones, the question of how much more revenue
Truthful and NearOptimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
"... We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.We show that for packing domains, any ffapproximation algorithm that also bounds the integrality gapof the LP relaxation of the problem by ff can be used to construct an ffapproximation mechanismthat is ..."
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Cited by 134 (12 self)
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ofeach item, and 2 for multiparameter knapsack problems (multiunit auctions). Our construction is based on considering an LP relaxation of the problem and using the classicVCG [25, 9, 12] mechanism to obtain a truthful mechanism in this fractional domain. We argue that the (fractional) optimal solution
Optimal Multiparameter Auction Design
, 2014
"... This thesis studies the design of Bayesian revenueoptimal auctions for a class of problems in which buyers have general (nonlinear and multiparameter) preferences. This class includes the classical linear singleparameter problem considered by Myerson (1981), for which he provided a simple charac ..."
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This thesis studies the design of Bayesian revenueoptimal auctions for a class of problems in which buyers have general (nonlinear and multiparameter) preferences. This class includes the classical linear singleparameter problem considered by Myerson (1981), for which he provided a simple
Results 1  10
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