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Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 647 (28 self)
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existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. ..."
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Cited by 169 (6 self)
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We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general
The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative multiagent systems
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI98
, 1998
"... Reinforcement learning can provide a robust and natural means for agents to learn how to coordinate their action choices in multiagent systems. We examine some of the factors that can influence the dynamics of the learning process in such a setting. We first distinguish reinforcement learners that a ..."
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Cited by 377 (1 self)
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structure and exploration strategies on convergence to (optimal and suboptimal) Nash equilibria. We then propose alternative optimistic exploration strategies that increase the likelihood of convergence to an optimal equilibrium.
Graphical Models for Game Theory
, 2001
"... We introduce a compact graphtheoretic representation for multiparty game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in onestage games represented by trees or sparse graphs. ..."
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Cited by 286 (23 self)
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We introduce a compact graphtheoretic representation for multiparty game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in onestage games represented by trees or sparse graphs.
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm
, 1998
"... In this paper, we adopt generalsum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zerosum stochastic games to a broader framework. We design a multiagent Qlearning method under this framework, and prove that it converges to a Na ..."
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Cited by 331 (4 self)
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Nash equilibrium under specified conditions. This algorithm is useful for finding the optimal strategy when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game. When there exist multiple Nash equilibria in the game, this algorithm should be combined with other learning techniques to find optimal
Position auctions
, 2007
"... I analyze the equilibria of a game based on the ad auction used by Google and Yahoo. This auction is closely related to the assignment game studied by ShapleyShubik, DemangeGaleSotomayer and RothSotomayer. However, due to the special structure of preferences, the equilibria of the ad auction can ..."
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Cited by 324 (4 self)
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I analyze the equilibria of a game based on the ad auction used by Google and Yahoo. This auction is closely related to the assignment game studied by ShapleyShubik, DemangeGaleSotomayer and RothSotomayer. However, due to the special structure of preferences, the equilibria of the ad auction
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria
, 2002
"... Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. ..."
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Cited by 135 (10 self)
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Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions.
Universality of Nash equilibria
 MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
, 2003
"... Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some threeperson game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an Nperson game in which each player has two pure strategies. From the NashTognoli Theorem it follows that every compact diffe ..."
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Cited by 11 (2 self)
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differentiable manifold can be encoded as the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some game. Moreover, there exist isolated Nash equilibria of arbitrary topological degree.
COMPUTATION OF EQUILIBRIA in Finite Games
, 1996
"... We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nitenperson games. Classical path following methods, such as the LemkeHowson algorithm for two person games, and Scarftype fixed point algorithms for nperson games provide globally convergent metho ..."
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Cited by 147 (1 self)
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We review the current state of the art of methods for numerical computation of Nash equilibria for nitenperson games. Classical path following methods, such as the LemkeHowson algorithm for two person games, and Scarftype fixed point algorithms for nperson games provide globally convergent
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
 In Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of selfinterested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions — the Nash equilibria — may look quite differ ..."
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Cited by 281 (30 self)
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Abstract. Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of selfinterested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions — the Nash equilibria — may look quite
Results 1  10
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2,731