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On two problems regarding the Hamiltonian cycle game

by Dan Hefetz, Sebastian Stich
"... We consider the fair Hamiltonian cycle Maker-Breaker game, played on the edge set of the complete graph Kn on n vertices. It is known that Maker wins this game if n is sufficiently large. We are interested in the minimum number of moves needed for Maker in order to win the Hamiltonian cycle game, an ..."
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We consider the fair Hamiltonian cycle Maker-Breaker game, played on the edge set of the complete graph Kn on n vertices. It is known that Maker wins this game if n is sufficiently large. We are interested in the minimum number of moves needed for Maker in order to win the Hamiltonian cycle game

Algorithmic Game Theory

by Tim Roughgarden , 2009
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 582 (15 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Games and decisions

by Debra Edwards Ph. D , 1957
"... Agency ..."
Abstract - Cited by 610 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Designing Games With A Purpose

by Luis von Ahn , Laura Dabbish , 2008
"... Data generated as a side effect of game play also solves computational problems and trains AI algorithms. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 524 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Data generated as a side effect of game play also solves computational problems and trains AI algorithms.

A Course in Game Theory

by Martin J. Osborne , 1994
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2571 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Knowledge representations, reasoning and declarative problem solving . . .

by Chitta Baral , 2001
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Abstract - Cited by 714 (43 self) - Add to MetaCart
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THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR IN A QUANTITATIVE BUSINESS CYCLE FRAMEWORK

by Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler, Simon Gilchrist , 1999
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1587 (30 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Irrelevant Features and the Subset Selection Problem

by George H. John, Ron Kohavi, Karl Pfleger - MACHINE LEARNING: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL , 1994
"... We address the problem of finding a subset of features that allows a supervised induction algorithm to induce small high-accuracy concepts. We examine notions of relevance and irrelevance, and show that the definitions used in the machine learning literature do not adequately partition the features ..."
Abstract - Cited by 741 (26 self) - Add to MetaCart
We address the problem of finding a subset of features that allows a supervised induction algorithm to induce small high-accuracy concepts. We examine notions of relevance and irrelevance, and show that the definitions used in the machine learning literature do not adequately partition the features

Theoretical improvements in algorithmic efficiency for network flow problems

by Jack Edmonds, Richard M. Karp - , 1972
"... This paper presents new algorithms for the maximum flow problem, the Hitchcock transportation problem, and the general minimum-cost flow problem. Upper bounds on ... the numbers of steps in these algorithms are derived, and are shown to compale favorably with upper bounds on the numbers of steps req ..."
Abstract - Cited by 565 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper presents new algorithms for the maximum flow problem, the Hitchcock transportation problem, and the general minimum-cost flow problem. Upper bounds on ... the numbers of steps in these algorithms are derived, and are shown to compale favorably with upper bounds on the numbers of steps

ERC -- A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition

by Gary E Bolton, Axel Ockenfels - FORTHCOMING AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW , 1999
"... We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two-perio ..."
Abstract - Cited by 699 (21 self) - Add to MetaCart
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, explains behavior in a wide variety of laboratory games. Included are games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum, two
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