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A new security model for authenticated key agreement

by Augustin P. Sarr - In SCN , 2010
"... The Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) and extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for key agreement protocols. We discuss security shades in the (e)CK models, and some practical attacks unconsidered in (e)CK–security arguments. We propose a strong security ..."
Abstract - Cited by 7 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
model which encompasses the eCK one. We also propose a new protocol, called Strengthened MQV (SMQV), which in addition to provide the same efficiency as the (H)MQV protocols, is particularly suited for distributed implementations wherein a tamper–proof device is used to store long–lived keys, while

Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols: Security Models, Analyses, and Designs

by École Doctorale, Mathématiques Et Informatique, Augustin P. Sarr, Prof Université , 2011
"... de l’Information, Informatique ..."
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de l’Information, Informatique

Efficient Key Exchange with Tight Security Reduction

by Jiang Wu, Berkant Ustaoglu
"... In this paper, we propose two authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, SMEN and SMEN − , which have efficient online computation and tight security proof in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. SMEN takes 1.25 exponentiations in online computation, close to that (1.17 exponentiations) of th ..."
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) of the most efficient AKEs MQV and its variants HMQV and CMQV. SMEN has a security reduction as tight as that of NAXOS, which is the first AKE having a tight security reduction in the eCK model. As a comparison, MQV does not have a security proof; both HMQV and CMQV have a highly non-tight security reduction

Efficient eCK-secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the Standard Model

by Zheng Yang
"... The extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open p ..."
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problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which

1 On Robust Key Agreement Based on Public Key Authentication

by Feng Hao
"... Abstract—This paper discusses public-key authenticated key agreement protocols. First, we critically analyze several authenticated key agreement protocols and uncover various theoretical and practical flaws. In particular, we present two new attacks on the HMQV protocol, which is currently being sta ..."
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efficiency. Our new key agreement protocol, YAK, has comparable computational efficiency to the MQV and HMQV protocols with clear advantages on security. Among all the related techniques, our protocol appears to be the simplest so far. We believe simplicity is also an important engineering principle. I.

Mind the Gap: Modular Machine-checked Proofs of One-Round Key Exchange Protocols?

by Gilles Barthe, Juan Manuel Crespo, Yassine Lakhnech, Benedikt Schmidt
"... Abstract. Using EasyCrypt, we formalize a new modular security proof for one-round authenticated key exchange protocols in the random or-acle model. Our proof improves earlier work by Kudla and Paterson (ASIACRYPT 2005) in three significant ways: we consider a stronger adversary model, we provide su ..."
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support tailored to protocols that utilize the Naxos trick, and we support proofs under the Computational DH assumption not relying on Gap oracles. Furthermore, our modular proof can be used to obtain concrete security proofs for protocols with or with-out adversarial key registration. We use this support

Efficient One-round Key Exchange in the Standard Model

by Colin Boyd, Yvonne Cliff, Juan Gonzalez Nieto, Kenneth G. Paterson , 2008
"... Abstract. We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protoco ..."
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Abstract. We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different

Modelling after-the-fact leakage for key exchange

by Janaka Alawatugoda, Douglas Stebila, Colin Boyd - In ASIACCS , 2014
"... Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to prove the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. In this work, we address more granular leakage: partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol principals, ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
model for key exchange protocols. We propose a generic construction of a two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the proposed model, by introducing a new concept: the leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. We identify a special property for public-key cryptosystems: pair generation

One-Round Key Exchange with Strong Security: An Efficient and Generic Construction in the Standard Model

by Florian Bergsma, Tibor Jager
"... Abstract. One-round authenticated key exchange (ORKE) is an es-tablished research area, with many prominent protocol constructions like HMQV (Krawczyk, CRYPTO 2005) and Naxos (La Macchia et al., ProvSec 2007), and many slightly different, strong security models. Most constructions combine ephemeral ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
and static Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE), in a manner often closely tied to the underlying se-curity model. We give a generic construction of ORKE protocols from general assump-tions, with security in the standard model, and in a strong security model where the attacker is even allowed to learn

FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes

by Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili , 2014
"... This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and ..."
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This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly
Results 1 - 10 of 226