Abstract Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental but much-overlooked cryptographic primitive. It appears as a major contribution in the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman, but NIKE has remained largely unstudied since then. In this paper, we provide different security models

for non-interactive key exchange protocols, while the non-interactivity makes them quite vulnerable since the public information cannot evolve from an execution to another one. In this paper we present a forward-secure non-interactive key exchange scheme with sub-linear complexity in the number of time

Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental notion in Cryptography. This notion was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. They proposed the celebrated 2-party NIKE protocol and left open as a fascinating question, whether NIKE could be realized in the mul-tiparty setting. NIKE has

of these problems in the complexity-theoretic framework of modern cryptography. Addressed in detail are two problems of the symmetric, two-party setting: mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange. For each we present a definition, protocol, and proof that the protocol meets its goal, assuming

before deployment. In the field, neighboring nodes exchange information to find one common key within their random subset and use that key as their shared secret to secure subsequent communication. In this paper, we generalize the Eschenauer-Gligor key distribution approach. First, we propose two new

Currently computers are changing from single isolated devices to entry points into a world wide network of information exchange and business transactions called the World Wide Web (WWW). Therefore support in the exchange of data, information, and knowledge exchange is becoming the key issue

Classical cryptographic protocols based on user-chosen keys allow an attacker to mount password-guessing attacks. We introduce a novel combination of asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric (secret-key) cryptography that allow two parties sharing a common password to exchange confidential

In a cell or microorganism the processes that generate mass, energy, information transfer, and cell fate specification are seamlessly integrated through a complex network of various cellular constituents and reactions. However, despite the key role these networks play in sustaining various cellular

This paper introduces a social network perspective to the study of strategic alliances. It extends prior research, which has primarily considered alliances as dyadic exchanges and paid less attention to the fact that key precursors, processes, and outcomes associated with alliances can be defined

Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) are designed to work despite the use of passwords drawn from a space so small that an adversary might well enumerate, off line, all possible passwords. While several such protocols have been suggested, the underlying theory has been