Results 1  10
of
221,407
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
Abstract

Cited by 630 (28 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
Abstract

Cited by 320 (23 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability
Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games
, 2013
"... We prove the existence of a purestrategy tremblinghand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess purestrategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We prove the existence of a purestrategy tremblinghand perfect equilibrium in upper semicontinuous potential games, and we show that generic potential games possess purestrategy strictly perfect and essential equilibria. We also establish a more powerful result: the set of maximizers of an upper
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
, 1991
"... According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note that if ..."
Abstract

Cited by 227 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1982
"... A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the singleperiod dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely repe ..."
Abstract

Cited by 380 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
A common observation in experiments involving finite repetition of the prisoners’ dilemma is that players do not always play the singleperiod dominant strategies (“finking”), but instead achieve some measure of cooperation. Yet finking at each stage is the only Nash equilibrium in the finitely
The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative multiagent systems
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI98
, 1998
"... Reinforcement learning can provide a robust and natural means for agents to learn how to coordinate their action choices in multiagent systems. We examine some of the factors that can influence the dynamics of the learning process in such a setting. We first distinguish reinforcement learners that a ..."
Abstract

Cited by 367 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
that are unaware of (or ignore) the presence of other agents from those that explicitly attempt to learn the value of joint actions and the strategies of their counterparts. We study (a simple form of) Qlearning in cooperative multiagent systems under these two perspectives, focusing on the influence of that game
Strategic Form Games and Nash Equilibrium
, 2013
"... This article introduces strategic form games, which provide a framework for the analysis of strategic interactions in multiagent environments. We present the main solution concept in strategic form games, Nash equilibrium, and provide tools for its systematic study. We present fundamental results f ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
This article introduces strategic form games, which provide a framework for the analysis of strategic interactions in multiagent environments. We present the main solution concept in strategic form games, Nash equilibrium, and provide tools for its systematic study. We present fundamental results
The Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibria
, 2004
"... We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 168 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multiplayer games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLScomplete in general
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm
, 1998
"... In this paper, we adopt generalsum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zerosum stochastic games to a broader framework. We design a multiagent Qlearning method under this framework, and prove that it converges to a Na ..."
Abstract

Cited by 325 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Nash equilibrium under specified conditions. This algorithm is useful for finding the optimal strategy when there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the game. When there exist multiple Nash equilibria in the game, this algorithm should be combined with other learning techniques to find optimal
Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks
 IEEE Trans. on Commun
, 2002
"... Abstract—A major challenge in the operation of wireless communications systems is the efficient use of radio resources. One important component of radio resource management is power control, which has been studied extensively in the context of voice communications. With the increasing demand for wir ..."
Abstract

Cited by 329 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
is referred to as the utility and distributed power control is a noncooperative power control game where users maximize their utility. The outcome of the game results in a Nash equilibrium that is inefficient. We introduce pricing of transmit powers in order to obtain Pareto improvement of the noncooperative
Results 1  10
of
221,407