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RSA modulus generation in the twoparty case
"... Abstract. In this paper, secure twoparty protocols are provided in order to securely generate a random kbit RSA modulus n keeping its factorization secret. We first show that most existing twoparty protocols based on Boneh’s test are not correct: an RSA modulus can be output in the malicious case ..."
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Abstract. In this paper, secure twoparty protocols are provided in order to securely generate a random kbit RSA modulus n keeping its factorization secret. We first show that most existing twoparty protocols based on Boneh’s test are not correct: an RSA modulus can be output in the malicious
Experimental Performance of Shared RSA Modulus Generation
 In proceedings of SODA '99
, 1998
"... y ..."
Efficient generation of shared RSA keys
 Advances in Cryptology  CRYPTO 97
, 1997
"... We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share of the ..."
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Cited by 150 (5 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share
Experimenting with Shared Generation of RSA keys
, 1999
"... We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization of ..."
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Cited by 40 (0 self)
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We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization
Improved Factoring of RSA Modulus
 THE 25TH WORKSHOP ON COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION THEORY
"... In 1999, the 512bit number of 155 digits taken from the RSA Challenge list was first factored by the General Number Field Sieve. This work was done on a supercomputer and about 300 PCs or workstations by 17 experts all over the world. The calendar time for the factorization was over 6 months. Based ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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. Based on the open source GGNFS, we improved its algorithms and implementations. Now the 512bit RSA modulus can be factored within 3 days by the highperformance computing resource at National Taiwan University.
Realizing Distributed RSA Key Generation using VIFF
"... In this experimental work, we have implemented and analyzed the performance of a protocol for multiparty RSA key generation. All players that take part in the key generation protocol get a share of the resulting private key, while no player gets any information about the prime numbers used. We have ..."
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In this experimental work, we have implemented and analyzed the performance of a protocol for multiparty RSA key generation. All players that take part in the key generation protocol get a share of the resulting private key, while no player gets any information about the prime numbers used. We have
Efficient Generation of Shared RSA keys (Extended Abstract)
 In Kaliski [103
"... We describe efficient techniques for three (or more) parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N . In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share o ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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We describe efficient techniques for three (or more) parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N . In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share
RSABased Undeniable Signatures
"... We present the first undeniable signatures scheme based on RSA. Since their introduction in 1989 a significant amount of work has been devoted to the investigation of undeniable signatures. So far, this work has been based on discrete log systems. In contrast, our scheme uses regular RSA signature ..."
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Cited by 78 (5 self)
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signatures to generate undeniable signatures. In this new setting, both the signature and verification exponents of RSA are kept secret by the signer, while the public key consists of a composite modulus and a sample RSA signature on a single public message. Our scheme possesses several attractive properties
Factoring estimates for a 1024bit RSA modulus
 IN: PROC. ASIACRYPT 2003, LNCS 2894
, 2003
"... We estimate the yield of the number field sieve factoring algorithm when applied to the 1024bit composite integer RSA1024 and the parameters as proposed in the draft version [17] of the TWIRL hardware factoring device [18]. We present the details behind the resulting improved parameter choices f ..."
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Cited by 17 (6 self)
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We estimate the yield of the number field sieve factoring algorithm when applied to the 1024bit composite integer RSA1024 and the parameters as proposed in the draft version [17] of the TWIRL hardware factoring device [18]. We present the details behind the resulting improved parameter choices
Two Party RSA Key Generation (Extended Abstract)
"... Abstract. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prim ..."
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Abstract. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d
Results 1  10
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