s2n is an implementation of the TLS protocol that was released in late June 2015 by Amazon. It is implemented in around 6,000 lines of C99 code. By comparison, OpenSSL needs around 70,000 lines of code to implement the protocol. At the time of its release, Amazon announced that s2n had undergone

. In this paper, we present distinguishing and plaintext recovery attacks against TLS and DTLS. The attacks are based on a delicate timing analysis of decryption processing in the two protocols. We include experimental results demonstrating the feasibility of the attacks in realistic network environments

of these side channels are timing-based, and two of them provide the first timing-based Bleichenbacher attacks on SSL/TLS described in the lit-erature. Our measurements confirmed that all these side channels are observable over a switched network, with timing differences between 1 and 23 microseconds. We were

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forward secrecy, and that it is prone to side channel attacks that may enable an attacker to learn the session key used for a TLS session. A long history of attacks shows that RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5 is extremely difficult to implement securely. The current draft of TLS version 1.3 dispenses with this encrypted

I would like to thank my parents for always believing in me. I would also like to thank my supervisors Richard Lindner and Johannes Buchmann for their useful comments and suggestions on how to improve the queality of the thesis. Not on last place I would like to thank Vadim Lyubashevsky and Luis Carlos Coronado Garcia for their kindness and readiness to answer my questions. Warranty I hereby warrant that the content of this thesis is the direct result of my own work and that any use made in it of published or unpublished material is fully and correctly referenced. I also warrant that the presented work has

Implementational aspects of code-based cryptography

this middleware. Any SSL connection from any of these programs is insecure against a man-in-the-middle attack. The root causes of these vulnerabilities are badly designed APIs of SSL implementations (such as JSSE, OpenSSL, and GnuTLS) and data-transport libraries (such as cURL) which present developers with a

serious alternative. This work analyzes the implementation of both a client-server and a peer-to-peer networking model for the prototype shooter game Planet π4. Initially, a survey introduces recent academic approaches to peer-to-peer systems specifically designed for games. Of those, one system

Algebraic methods in analyzing