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4,557
Local Smoothness and the Price of Anarchy in Atomic Splittable Congestion Games
"... We resolve the worst-case price of anarchy (POA) of atomic splittable congestion games. Prior to this work, no tight bounds on the POA in such games were known, even for the simplest non-trivial special case of affine cost functions. We make two distinct contributions. On the upperbound side, we def ..."
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Cited by 19 (3 self)
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We resolve the worst-case price of anarchy (POA) of atomic splittable congestion games. Prior to this work, no tight bounds on the POA in such games were known, even for the simplest non-trivial special case of affine cost functions. We make two distinct contributions. On the upperbound side, we
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
- MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING SOCIETY NEWSLETTER
, 2007
"... Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how self-interested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure of this in ..."
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Cited by 252 (11 self)
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Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how self-interested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure
The robust price of anarchy of altruistic games
- In Proc. 7th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE
, 2011
"... We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i’s perceived cost is a convex combination of 1−αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows sm ..."
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Cited by 14 (3 self)
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. We show that this extension captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games, and use it to derive mostly tight bounds. For congestion games and cost-sharing games, the worst-case robust price of anarchy increases with increasing altruism, while for utility
Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow
- In Proc. of the 6th Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA), volume 5426 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2008
"... We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmetric load balancing games and show that the price of anarchy is bounded from above by m, where m denotes the number of coal ..."
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmetric load balancing games and show that the price of anarchy is bounded from above by m, where m denotes the number
AAltruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy
"... We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i’s perceived cost is a convex combination of 1−αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi allows smooth int ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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of these games for several solution concepts. Thereto, we suitably adapt the smoothness notion introduced by Roughgarden and show that it captures the essential properties to determine the robust price of anarchy of these games. Our bounds show that for atomic conges-tion games and cost-sharing games, the robust
The Price of Anarchy . . .
, 2012
"... We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an “extension theorem ” for such games: price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extend automatically, without quantitative degradation, to all mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria with respect ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an “extension theorem ” for such games: price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extend automatically, without quantitative degradation, to all mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria with respect
The Price of Anarchy is Unbounded for Congestion Games with Superpolynomial Latency Costs
"... ar ..."
The Hero with a Thousand Faces
, 1972
"... Botiingen Foundation, andpttt.!.,.: b % / ,.,;:,c,m B<,.ik.*, second ..."
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Cited by 353 (0 self)
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Botiingen Foundation, andpttt.!.,.: b % / ,.,;:,c,m B<,.ik.*, second
The Robust Price of Anarchy of Altruistic
"... Abstract. We study the inefficiency of equilibria for several classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i’s perceived cost is a convex combination of 1−αi times his direct cost and αi times the social cost. Tuning the parameters αi ..."
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αi allows smooth interpolation between purely selfish and purely altruistic behavior. Within this framework, we study altruistic extensions of cost-sharing games, utility games, and linear congestion games. Our main contribution is an adaptation of Roughgarden’s smoothness notion to altruistic
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4,557
