### Table 5. Algorithm: Fictitious play for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games using a model.

2000

"... In PAGE 6: ...1 Fictitious Play Fictitious play (Robinson, 1951; Vrieze, 1987) assumes opponents play stationary strategies. The basic game the- ory algorithm is shown in Table5 . The algorithm main- tains information about the average value of each action (i.... ..."

Cited by 17

### Table 5. Algorithm: Fictitious play for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games using a model.

2000

"... In PAGE 6: ...1 Fictitious Play Fictitious play (Robinson, 1951; Vrieze, 1987) assumes opponents play stationary strategies. The basic game the- ory algorithm is shown in Table5 . The algorithm main- tains information about the average value of each action (i.... ..."

Cited by 17

### Table 5: Algorithm: Fictitious play for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games using a model.

2000

"... In PAGE 9: ...1 Fictitious Play Fictitious play [16, 25] assumes opponents play stationary strategies. The basic game theory algorithm is shown in Table5 .... ..."

Cited by 17

### Table 5: Algorithm: Fictitious play for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games using a model.

2000

"... In PAGE 9: ...1 Fictitious Play Fictitious play [16, 25] assumes opponents play stationary strategies. The basic game theory algorithm is shown in Table5 .... ..."

Cited by 17

### Table 5: Algorithm: Fictitious play for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games using a model.

2000

"... In PAGE 9: ...1 Fictitious Play Fictitious play [16, 25] assumes opponents play stationary strategies. The basic game theory algorithm is shown in Table5 .... ..."

Cited by 17

### Table 5: Algorithm: Fictitious play for two-player, zero-sum stochastic games using a model.

2000

Cited by 17

### Table 3: Iterated weak dominance solvability in two-player ranking games

in Abstract

"... In PAGE 8: ... We thus claim that IWD-SOLVABLE for ranking games with two players can be decided by finding a unique action a1 of player 1 by which he always wins, and a unique action a2 of player 2 by which he wins for a maximum number of actions of player 1. This situation is shown Table3 . If such actions do not exist or are not unique, the game cannot be solved by means of iterated weak dominance.... In PAGE 8: ... 3Since two-player ranking games are a subclass of constant-sum games, weak dominance and nice weak dominance (Marx amp; Swinkels, 1997) coincide, making iterated weak dominance order independent up to payoff-equivalent action profiles. This fact is mirrored by Table3 , since there cannot be a row of 1s and a column of 2s in the same matrix.... ..."

### Table 1.1: Complexity of two-player games

### Table 3 Algorithm: Minimax-Q for player i. The Valuei operator computes the value of a zero-sum matrix game, i.e., the expected payo to the player if both players play the Nash equilibrium.

2002

Cited by 118