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177
Improving the Hkbound on the price of stability in undirected shapley network design games
 In CIAC
, 2013
"... Abstract. In this paper we show that the price of stability of Shapley network design games on undirected graphs with k players is at most k3(k+1)/2−k2 1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk = 1−Θ(1/k4))Hk, where Hk denotes the kth harmonic number. This improves on the known upper bound of Hk, which is also valid for d ..."
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Abstract. In this paper we show that the price of stability of Shapley network design games on undirected graphs with k players is at most k3(k+1)/2−k2 1+k3(k+1)/2−k2Hk = 1−Θ(1/k4))Hk, where Hk denotes the kth harmonic number. This improves on the known upper bound of Hk, which is also valid
On the price of stability for undirected network design
, 2010
"... We continue the study of the effects of selfish behavior in the network design problem. We provide new bounds for the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs. We consider the most general case, for which the best known upper bound is the Harmonic number ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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We continue the study of the effects of selfish behavior in the network design problem. We provide new bounds for the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs. We consider the most general case, for which the best known upper bound is the Harmonic number
An Hn/2 Upper Bound on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games ∗
, 2014
"... In the network design game with n players, every player chooses a path in an edgeweighted graph to connect her pair of terminals, sharing costs of the edges on her path with all other players fairly. We study the price of stability of the game, i.e., the ratio of the social costs of a best Nash equ ..."
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equilibrium (with respect to the social cost) and of an optimal play. It has been shown that the price of stability of any network design game is at most Hn, the nth harmonic number. This bound is tight for directed graphs. For undirected graphs, the situation is dramatically different, and tight bounds
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation
 In Proceedings of the 45th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects of strategic behavior. Given a collection of selfinterested agents who want to form a network connecting certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions — the Nash equilibria — may look quite differ ..."
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Cited by 281 (30 self)
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that can be proposed from which no user will defect. We consider the price of stability for network design with respect to one of the most widelystudied protocols for network cost allocation, in which the cost of each edge is divided equally between users whose connections make use of it; this fair
The Price of Stability of Fair Undirected Broadcast Games
"... Bounding the price of stability of undirected network design games with fair cost allocation is a challenging open problem in the Algorithmic Game Theory research agenda. Even though the generalization of such games in directed networks is well understood in terms of the price of stability (it is ex ..."
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Bounding the price of stability of undirected network design games with fair cost allocation is a challenging open problem in the Algorithmic Game Theory research agenda. Even though the generalization of such games in directed networks is well understood in terms of the price of stability (it
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUIUM ON AUTOMATA, LANGUAGES, AND PROGRAMMING (ICALP
, 2006
"... In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in [1]. We consider the case where there is an agent in every vertex. We show that the price of stability is O(log log n). We prove this by defining a ..."
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Cited by 34 (1 self)
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In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in [1]. We consider the case where there is an agent in every vertex. We show that the price of stability is O(log log n). We prove this by defining
An O(log n/ log log n) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
 Information Processing Letters
, 2009
"... log n ..."
On the Value of Coordination in Network Design
"... We study network design games where n selfinterested agents have to form a network by purchasing links from a given set of edges. We consider Shapley cost sharing mechanisms that split the cost of an edge in a fair manner among the agents using the edge. It is well known that the price of anarchy o ..."
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Cited by 36 (0 self)
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to the concept of strong Nash equilibria, which were introduced by Aumann and are resilient to deviations by coalitions of agents. We analyze the price of anarchy of strong Nash equilibria and develop lower and upper bounds for unweighted and weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs. These bounds
Designing networks with good equilibria
 In SODA ’08
, 2007
"... In a network with selfish users, designing and deploying a protocol determines the rules of the game by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We study the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of the induced network game. We consider network co ..."
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Cited by 34 (4 self)
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In a network with selfish users, designing and deploying a protocol determines the rules of the game by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We study the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of the induced network game. We consider network
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