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“Having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central banking in practice is as much art as science. Nonetheless, while practicing this dark art, I have always found the science quEite useful.” 2 Alan S. Blinder

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In this article we propose a standard for role-based access control (RBAC). Although RBAC models have received broad support as a generalized approach to access control, and are well recognized for their many advantages in performing large-scale authorization management, no single authoritative

This paper reviews recent research that grapples with the question: What happens after an exogenous shock to monetary policy? We argue that this question is interesting because it lies at the center of a particular approach to assessing the empirical plausibility of structural economic models

Andrew Warner for generously sharing their data with us. We are particularly grateful to Ben-David, Frankel, Romer, Sachs, Warner and Romain Wacziarg for helpful e-mail exchanges. We have benefited greatly from discussions in seminars at the University of California at Berkeley,

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We propose a new approach to reinforcement learning for control problems which combines value-function approximation with linear architectures and approximate policy iteration. This new approach

The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker